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ABSTRACT 
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) plays a key role in disaster response. Yet, 
determining how much preparedness is enough to achieve an acceptable level of 
preparedness is challenging. After conducting an extensive literature review, it is evident 
no nationally accepted method exists to evaluate an EMS system’s level of disaster 
preparedness systematically. 
Research was conducted to define the skills and equipment that local emergency 
medical services agencies (LEMSA) or a similar entity needs to perform strategic disaster 
response duties and identify performance indicators for measuring preparedness. Using 
an appreciative inquiry approach, surveys and interviews of EMS personnel from across 
the nation were conducted. Interview questions focused on the positive aspects of each 
response with an effort to understand what might be possible in future events. Research 
subjects had first-hand experience in managing the EMS response during a disaster. 
Multiple types and sizes of events were studied. 
A framework for defining minimum standards for adequate disaster preparedness 
for LEMSAs is constructed, including core EMS disaster response roles; essential 
competencies; skills needed to perform the core roles; and tools or equipment used for 
core roles. Training strategies for developing experience, competencies, and skills are 
identified, and metrics listed for measuring the level of preparedness. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND 
Disaster preparedness is a concept easy enough to understand but quite difficult to 
define as having achieved. Defining the extent to which an agency must be prepared for a 
disaster is elusive because a single definition of a disaster does not seem to exist. Of the 
various disciplines that have a role in responding to disasters, reaching consensus as to 
the definition of disaster within each discipline is rare. Attempts to define a disaster 
become even more complex across disciplines.  
The mission of responding agencies vary by function, discipline, geography, and 
jurisdiction. Roles and responsibilities vary with each agency depending upon the type of 
emergency and the tasks being performed at each level in the organization. 
Understandably, different perspectives held by various responder agencies and disciplines 
produce varied opinions as to how to define a disaster and how to define preparedness. 
The White House defined preparedness as, “…the existence of plans, procedures, 
policies, training, and equipment necessary at the federal, state, and local level to 
maximize the ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from major events” (The White 
House, 2003). Although various definitions of preparedness may exist, it can be argued 
that a definition issued by the executive branch of the federal government is likely to 
contain a broad enough approach so that it is common to all jurisdictions in the nation. 
States and local jurisdictions often follow the federal government’s lead regarding 
disaster preparedness. 
States and local jurisdictions devote significant time, energy, and resources in 
developing disaster response plans and emergency management capabilities. Training is 
conducted to validate and incorporate the plans into accepted procedures operationally. 
Tabletop and functional exercises are periodically performed to validate the contents of 
plans, identify and mitigate weaknesses, and build skills of emergency response 
personnel. Actions taken by states and local jurisdictions related to disaster preparedness 
are often motivated by federal funding. 
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Grant programs through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and 
other federal sources, that are funneled through state governments and passed on to local 
governments, augment the ability to acquire equipment, tools, and training to be better 
prepared for disasters. Federal grant funds have been used to purchase specialized 
vehicles, safety gear, information technology infrastructure, communications equipment, 
develop plans, conduct training and exercises and so on to enhance the local 
government’s capability to respond to many different kinds of natural or manmade 
disasters. As an example, several consecutive years of the Hospital Preparedness Program 
grants have provided hospitals in some areas of the nation the ability to care for a surge 
of some 50 additional patients per hospital that are anticipated during disasters (R. Elliott, 
2009). 
It can be argued that the grant programs have facilitated local jurisdictions’ 
preparedness by acquiring goods and services that will improve the ability to respond to 
disasters (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007, p. 2). It is presumed by local 
leaders that the grant-funded equipment, development of plans, and for example, the 
existence of a new emergency operations center (EOC) will enhance a jurisdiction’s level 
of preparedness (Board of Supervisors, County of Kern, 2006). However, to what extent 
are states and local jurisdictions better prepared to respond to and address the 
consequences of a natural or man-made disaster?  
The Emergency Medical Service (EMS) discipline plays a key role in disaster 
planning, response and recovery. According to the U.S. Homeland Security Department 
Target Capabilities List, EMS is fully or partially responsible for all of the following 
mission response areas: on-scene incident management, emergency triage and pre-
hospital treatment, medical surge, medical supplies management and distribution, mass 
prophylaxis, and mass care and sheltering (U.S. Homeland Security Department, 2007). 
Yet, no nationally accepted methodology or process is in place to evaluate and measure 
an EMS system’s level of disaster preparedness systematically. However, several 
methods have been proposed or tested. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, 
United States’ preparedness became a higher priority. Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive Number 8 (HSPD-8) called for establishment of measurable readiness 
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priorities, standards, and metrics (The White House, 2003). The broad policy document 
advancing HSPD-8 is the National Preparedness Guidelines, and this document lists 
eight national priorities for preparedness. Priority number seven is, “Strengthen Medical 
Surge and Mass Prophylaxis Capabilities.” (U.S. Homeland Security Department, 2007, 
p. 11) Considerable effort to develop the Target Capabilities List (U.S. Homeland 
Security Department, 2007, pp. 447–488) has been extended, and significant progress 
seems to have been made to define discipline-specific preparedness through the goals and 
objectives. However, more work in the medical discipline is needed. According to the 
Center for American Progress, the federal government must enhance partnership efforts 
with state and local governments, and, “make national preparedness an urgent priority, 
particularly public health and medical readiness” (Crowley, 2008, p. 52). 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)’s then Chief of Operational 
Integration, Operations Management Division Paul Schwartz, in a 2009 interview 
suggested that FEMA focus its preparedness efforts in the upcoming year on mass care, 
public health, and medical needs, among a handful of other issues (Schwartz, 2009, p. 3). 
The need to address medical readiness and develop a way to measure its level of 
preparedness is evident. EMS is an essential component of medical readiness and 
understanding preparedness in EMS will support the national preparedness efforts. 
Lacking the ability to measure preparedness leaves local governments unaware of 
the EMS system’s ability to respond to a disaster. Without knowledge of capabilities and 
capacities, the ability to respond could be left to chance and might leave residents 
unnecessarily vulnerable during a major event. Without measurements that identify 
existing capabilities against the needed capabilities to respond to and recover from a 
disaster effectively, it is not possible to know if the appropriate level of preparedness has 
been achieved. Without such measurements, local governments may continue to function 
under the status quo of making the best judgments possible about resource and training 
needs for disaster preparedness based on intuition, conjecture, and past practices. Better 
decisions can possibly be made using an evidenced-based disaster preparedness 
measurement process. 
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How much preparedness in EMS is enough, and what is the minimum level of 
preparedness needed for the system to be able to respond to all likely hazards? Will the 
necessary action need to gain the target level of preparedness vary by the nature of the 
disaster? What core common capabilities will be required to respond to the majority or 
probable disasters local EMS systems may face? Without clearly defining EMS system 
preparedness and developing a method or process to measure preparedness, these answers 
cannot be definitively answered. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Local emergency medical services agencies (LEMSA) are organizations, often at 
a county or regional governmental department or division level that oversee and manage 
EMS systems. LEMSAs typically provide medical leadership and direction for 
emergency service providers, as well as the authority for fire departments, ambulance 
companies, paramedics and others to deliver medical care to the public. LEMSAs bring 
the components of an EMS together into a coordinated system and prevent fragmentation, 
set and raise the standards for medical care, and work on solutions to system problems 
(Tierney, 1985, p. 78). The roles that LEMSAs are expected to play during disasters are 
unique and essential. As the responsibilities involve immediate and rapid care to the sick 
and injured, EMS plays a key part during the initial stages of disasters.  
Not all U.S. states organize EMS systems according to the LEMSA model. A 
state agency may provide the services described above, or in some cases, a hospital or 
other organization may provide those services. In any regard, some organizational 
structure exists within each state that fulfills a LEMSA’s disaster response roles. For 
purposes of this thesis, the organizations are termed LEMSA regardless of the actual 
organizational structure. This research focuses on the disaster response role played by 
these supporting organizations rather than the organizational structure itself. 
It is important to clarify the role of a LEMSA or supporting organization from a 
frontline EMS system provider, such as an ambulance company or fire department. 
LEMSAs support the work performed by frontline EMS system providers. However, it is 
not necessarily the role of LEMSA staff members to be at the scene of an incident or the 
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command post. Sometimes this is appropriate and such activity facilitates the response. 
Often, a LEMSA provides its support role from an office behind the scenes, a department 
operations center (DOC), or an emergency operations center (EOC). This varied role of a 
LEMSA depends on the circumstances of the event and the disaster response plans within 
an individual jurisdiction. For example, a LEMSA may be responsible for treating 
patients. This does not necessarily mean that staff members from the LEMSA have their 
hands on patients at the scene and are providing frontline life-saving care. Rather, the 
LEMSA is responsible for working with the frontline EMS system providers to ensure 
the work is completed appropriately. Many LEMSA responsibilities are accomplished by 
delegating tasks to EMS system providers. 
The Target Capabilities List identifies three specific response mission capabilities 
that clearly are the primary, and in some states, the statutory responsibility of the 
LEMSA. These include: 1) emergency triage and pre-hospital treatment, 2) medical 
surge, and 3) medical supplies management and distribution (U.S. Homeland Security 
Department, 2007, pp. 447–488). In the context of these three broad functional areas, the 
LEMSA should be prepared to accomplish the following strategic objectives. 
• Meeting transport volume demand 
• Distributing patients to hospitals and care facilities throughout the system 
and beyond to match capabilities to needs so as not to overburden one 
facility while another facility is working below its capacity 
• Treating and releasing patients at field treatment sites or clinics, when 
possible 
• Managing the convergence of large numbers of ambulances and personnel 
According to Kathleen J. Tierney, PhD, a research associate at the Disaster 
Research Center, Ohio State University, in the process of accomplishing these strategic 
objectives, the LEMSA should be prepared to encounter the following challenges during 
a disaster. 
• Increasing patient volumes; greater demands for care/service 
• Coping with and adapting to the changed environment, whether the 
disaster was natural or man-caused 
• Having first responders and hospitals with damaged equipment or 
facilities, loss of utilities, and staff shortages (Tierney, 1985, p. 80)  
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• Delivering care in substandard circumstances  
• Increasing demand from the public, patients’ families, news media, and 
policy makers for information; the demand for information will be 
exponentially greater during a disaster than on a routine daily basis 
(Tierney, 1985, p. 80)  
• Having a means to communicate information can be diminished or 
insufficient; the normal communication tools and technology available on 
a normal day may not be fully functional (Tierney, 1985, p. 80) 
• Managing and supporting large numbers of people, vehicles, and resources 
(mutual aid resources and volunteer good Samaritans). (Tierney, 1985, p. 
81) 
• Anticipating differences in types of equipment, scope of practice 
inconsistencies, different operational procedures, and different radio 
communication standards; thereby, increasing the complexity of managing 
the event (Tierney, 1985, p. 81) 
In addition to the items identified by Tierney, it is also important to address the 
challenges of performing the LEMSA roles with smaller numbers of full-time employees. 
A difficult economic environment, a prolonged disaster response effort, or perhaps a 
pandemic scenario may cause this. 
This thesis attempts to answer this fundamental question as it relates to a 
LEMSA: How confident can one be that the people put into place to respond to disastrous 
events possess the knowledge and resources needed to manage the situation when called 
upon? (Jackson, 2008, p. 11). More specifically, this research seeks to answer the 
following two questions. 
1. What are the skills and equipment a LEMSA needs to perform its strategic 
duties, in light of the various types of disasters and challenges possibly 
faced, to fulfill its role successfully in responding to the needs of the 
community during a disaster?  
2. What are indicators that a LEMSA’s preparatory actions are sufficient to 
fulfill its role in responding to the needs of the community during a 
disaster?  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The literature review conducted for this project is fairly extensive; it contains 11 
sub-sections. Each sub-section is summarized below. 
Reasons for Measuring Preparedness: This sub-section contains a history of 
preparedness since September 11, 2001, and how preparedness efforts have evolved. A 
prevalent theme in the literature is that preparedness measurement is tied to 
funding/money. Whether the context is accountability of monies already allocated, 
justifying additional expenditures, or determining the cost, becoming prepared 
concerning funding is a significant component of preparedness. 
Role of Emergency Medical Services: The Emergency Medical Services (EMS) 
plays a significant role during a disaster response. However, that role is significantly 
different from its day-to-day role. The metamorphosis in roles for disaster response 
requires unique actions for preparedness. 
Measuring Preparedness in the Context of Emergency Management, Public 
Health, and Emergency Medical Services: Not much literature is available on the specific 
topic of measuring disaster preparedness for EMS. Consequently, it is necessary to 
research similar fields, such as Emergency Management and Public Health, and attempt 
to draw conclusions from those fields and apply the research and findings to EMS.  
Measuring Preparedness is Difficult: Specific difficulties in attempting to measure 
preparedness are identified and discussed. 
Ideas for Measuring Preparedness: Given the difficulties in measuring 
preparedness, a few logical approaches and methodologies for successfully conducting 
the measurements are presented. 
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Accuracy—Objective vs. Subjective Measurements: Measuring preparedness in a 
meaningful way cannot be performed solely with objective measurements. Rather, the 
use of subjective measurements is unavoidable, and subjective measurements do not 
invalidate the accuracy of the results. 
Leadership from the Federal Level: One of the significant challenges facing 
disaster preparedness measurement is the lack of consistency in the measurements. 
Measurements vary by jurisdiction, by state, and by time. No consensus has been reached 
within disciplines on standardized measurements. The literature indicates that federal 
action to establish standard measurements is needed. 
Federal Actions: Actions that have been taken by the federal government towards 
measuring preparedness are chronicled.  
Gaps in the Literature: The lack of specific core competencies in the literature for 
a local EMS agency’s disaster response capabilities is identified. Further, the lack of a 
specific definition of disaster as it pertains to EMS is not found in the literature. 
Funding: Funding drives preparedness measurement efforts in many ways. 
Federal agencies must have a means to hold those receiving grant funds accountable for 
spending appropriately. Future funding opportunities can be based on the success of past 
funding programs; and thus, measurements become important in understanding progress. 
Moreover, a consistent and standardized measurement method is needed to validate if 
funds have been expended appropriately. 
B. REASONS FOR MEASURING PREPAREDNESS 
Measuring preparedness was identified as an important activity in a number of 
different journal articles, academic studies, Congressional reports, and other sources. A 
variety of reasons is given to justify measuring the extent to which the nation, states, and 
local jurisdictions are prepared for disasters. Measuring preparedness is somewhat of a 
paradox; successful preparedness results in the absence of poor outcomes during a 
disaster (Covington & Simpson, 2006, p. 22). In other words, a critical event that could  
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have otherwise been disastrous was not because of robust preparedness makes it difficult 
to quantify the value of preparedness. Regardless of this phenomenon, numerous research 
works support the concept of measuring preparedness. 
With issuance of Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 8 (The White 
House, 2003), former President George W. Bush ordered all federal agencies to develop 
metrics for preparedness. Specifically, HSPD-8 directed that measureable readiness 
priorities be established, and that readiness metrics and elements (including standards for 
preparedness assessments and strategies) be developed. The Presidential directive called 
for the development of a system of assessing the nation’s overall prevention and response 
preparedness within one year from the date of issuance. Readiness assessments in 
rudimentary forms appear as requirements in federal homeland security grants to states 
and local jurisdictions. 
Beyond a federal mandate, other valid reasons can measure preparedness. One 
such reason is to identify the strengths and weakness, or gaps, of an organization’s 
preparedness capability and to facilitate resilience of that organization or community. 
According to Homeland security: Standards for State and Local Prepardness 
Congressional Research Service report, measuring preparedness facilitates improvements 
in response capabilities and intergovernmental coordination, and identifying gaps serves 
to promote long-term sustained preparedness (Canada, October 2003). It is difficult to 
determine the validity and weaknesses of local emergency plans unless a standardized 
method to measure preparedness is employed (Simpson, 2004, pp. 3–4). Moreover, 
measuring preparedness in a standardized manner allows one community to be compared 
to another. Such a comparison provides a greater understanding and context of 
preparedness strengths and weaknesses (Covington & Simpson, 2006, p. 6). If measuring 
preparedness provides knowledge and this information is used to mitigate legitimate 
preparedness weaknesses, then proper fact-based decisions may produce more resilient 
communities (Covington & Simpson, 2006, p. 6). 
A premise in process improvement theory is that a baseline be established to 
facilitate the measurement of change. The same concept can be applied to measuring 
preparedness. It is difficult to determine if progress towards a goal is being made 
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definitively unless some method of measurement is used. Another reason for measuring 
performance is to understand if change has occurred from a starting point or baseline 
(Doherty, 2004, p. 38). Further, managers or others given the responsibility for achieving 
preparedness cannot provide evidence or understand the extent of progress without 
measurement (Falkenrath, 2000, p. 15). 
The most prevalent reason uncovered in the literature for measuring preparedness 
relates to money. Primarily, a certain amount of accountability is needed to ensure that 
federal grant dollars have been and are being used wisely. Policy makers need 
information to make rational allocation decisions (Falkenrath, 2000, p. 15). This is 
evident in seeing the number of congressional bills that have been introduced to address 
preparedness standards; politicians want to ensure accountability for expenditure of the 
billions of dollars towards homeland security preparedness efforts (Canada, October 
2003). By not articulating preparedness standards, endless escalation of spending may 
occur (Falkenrath, 2000, p. 15), especially in the heat of patriotic emotion stirred by 
another terrorist attack on U.S. soil. According to the Government Accounting Agency 
(GAO), grant programs administered by the Department of Homeland Security do not 
have strong accountability components (Jenkins, 2008, p. 5). This may be due to the 
difficulty in measuring preparedness. However, the lack of accountability for building 
preparedness capabilities leaves decision makers unaware if policies are effective or if 
policy changes should be made (Jenkins, 2008, p. 5).  
Development of nationwide preparedness standards, including the development of 
a baseline, could lead to greater accountability. Such a tool could provide Congress and 
federal agencies a means of gauging effectiveness of new preparedness programs 
(Canada, October 2003). A considerable amount of tax dollars have been spent on 
disaster preparedness. Yet, it is not possible to demonstrate definitively that the 
investment has been worthwhile; developing accountability for expenditure of grant 




Other reasons have been found that support the need to measure preparedness. 
Organizations using a recognized evidenced-based measurement tool may discover gaps 
exist in their preparedness efforts. It is plausible that such information can be leveraged 
in competition for grant funding (Simpson, 2004, p. 3). Towns and cities that employ an 
evidenced-based preparedness measurement tool and show significant progress may be 
used as justification to lower hazard and homeowners’ insurance rates, or to allow 
jurisdictions to compare qualities to one another (Simpson, 2004, pp. 3–4). Further, a 
finding that one community is significantly behind another community in preparedness 
efforts can provide the political fuel to emphasize the need for increasing preparedness 
activity (Simpson, 2004, pp. 3–4). In any regard, measuring preparedness can be used to 
guide efficient allocation of resources (Covington & Simpson, 2006, p. 6), whether the 
resources are federal grant funds or local tax dollars. 
Those opposed to measuring preparedness argue that establishing a baseline could 
pose a significant financial burden on states and localities and interfere with local 
priorities (Canada, October 2003). States and localities not meeting baselines could be 
pressured by constituents or through coercive federalism grant programs to shift priorities 
and expend resources in a direction that might be inconsistent with local needs (Clovis, 
2006, p. 13). Municipalities have experienced an example of this concept recently.  
Changes in federal regulations of accounting standards have required different 
calculations for liabilities. The new calculation promulgated by the new regulation 
resulted in significant unfunded liabilities being incurred with respect to future retirement 
costs, forcing jurisdictions to expend resources to address these new liabilities (IAFF, 
2006, p. 1). Another reason for opposing establishment of federal preparedness measures 
is the bureaucracy associated with the measurements and accountability. Dr. Clovis found 
that grant accountability has become more important and requires more time and effort 
than achieving the actual homeland security goals (Clovis, 2006, p. 13). Although it can 
be argued that any federal expenditure used appropriately will probably facilitate 
improvement in preparedness, is there any value in taking the time to measure and 
quantify that change in preparedness? Given the preponderance of literature on the topic, 
valid reasons seem to exist to warrant further exploration of this question. 
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C. ROLE OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES 
Federal enabling legislation that resulted in the proliferation of civilian EMS 
systems in the nation occurred in 1973. According to Tierney, the law “…was based on 
the assumption that ‘systems’ of service delivery could be developed that would 
encompass all phases of patient care: the pre-hospital phase, which includes the 
immediate first response and emergency transportation; hospital emergency room care; 
and definitive care” (Tierney, 1985, p. 78). Thirty-one separate EMS systems exist in 
California, and all of them are operated on the premise described by Tierney. EMS 
functions on a daily basis as a system of distinct components that collaborate for the 
benefit of a patient or victim, as described in Table 3-1.  
The role of EMS during a disaster is very different from EMS on a regular day. It 
can be anticipated that disasters will produce many more patients than normal. This 
places greater demands on the first responders, including fire departments and ambulance 
services, and greater patient volume impacts hospital emergency departments and the 
entire hospital institution. Often, events that overwhelm the normally available resources 
cause mutual aid to be requested from neighboring jurisdictions. 
 
Table 3–1. Typical Goals of an EMS System—Daily vs. Disaster (From:  Tierney, 
1985, pp. 77–84) 
It should be noted that the public might not be aware of the changing priorities of 
the EMS system during a disaster. The public may expect the same level of service 
during a disaster enjoyed on a routine, daily basis. An inability to meet the public’s 
expectations during a disaster may be a source of criticism after the event. 
On a routine, daily basis During a disaster 
• Response time to each call • Meeting transport volume demand 
• Transport to best destination • Distribute patients evenly through 
the system 
• Transport to hospital • Treat and release at field treatment 
site or clinics 
• Normal system management • Convergence of large numbers of 
ambulances and personnel 
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During a disaster, hospitals may be faced with damage to equipment or facilities, 
loss of utilities, and staff shortages (Tierney, 1985, p. 80). Not only is the demand greater 
because of increased patient volumes, but the circumstances in which care must be 
delivered could be less than optimal. In addition, hospitals and EMS agencies are likely 
to experience a greater demand from the public, patients’ families, news media, and 
policy makers for information. Information about the crisis, information about the status 
of the EMS system and hospital status, information about numbers and conditions of 
victims, people looking for missing loved ones, and so on. The demand for information is 
exponentially greater during a disaster than on a routine daily basis (Tierney, 1985, p. 
80). Although demands will be greater, the means to communicate information can be 
diminished. Depending on the nature of the disaster, phone lines, cell phones, and 
Internet service may be disrupted. The normal communication tools and technology 
available on a normal day may not be fully functional (Tierney, 1985, p. 80). 
As mutual aid resources and volunteer good Samaritans arrive, the local EMS 
agency will be faced with a large numbers of people, vehicles, and resources to support 
and manage (Tierney, 1985, p. 81). Differences in types of equipment, EMT and 
paramedic scope of practices, operational procedures, and radio communication standards 
may be experienced. These differences increase the complexity of managing the event 
(Tierney, 1985, p. 81). 
During a disaster, the entire EMS system’s concept of operation may need to 
endure a metamorphosis. On a daily basis, the EMS system is designed to send medical 
services rapidly to the scene of an emergency and rescue individual patients. In a disaster, 
the increased demand for service, combined with the lack of immediately available 
resources, forces the EMS system to centralize services. Rather than send resources to 
every emergency, theoretically, it may be necessary to prioritize calls. Several calls for 
service may go unanswered in the near term. Plans may be in place to substitute a routine 
response with information on locations people can go to seek emergency care on their 
own. The operational mode may need to transition from serving individuals to serving the 
masses. EMS goals during disasters are different from daily goals, as shown in the Table 
3-1. 
 14
In the management of the EMS system during a disaster, the local EMS agency 
must strive to control patient flow (Tierney, 1985, p. 81). A large segment of the 
population will gravitate towards the nearest hospital following a disaster. This 
phenomenon, termed the worried well, purports that non-injured survivors of a disastrous 
event seek some measure of security at the nearest hospital. The large influx of people 
seeking medical attention, whether warranted or not, overwhelms hospital resources and 
diverts the few resources available away from the seriously injured victims that need 
immediate attention. Controlling patient flow becomes a local EMS agency’s 
responsibility because the EMS system will fail if the hospital cannot continue to 
function. 
Techniques used to control patient flow vary, but the first step typically involves 
closing off access to hospitals. All doorways are locked and guarded, and no one is 
allowed entrance to the main facility. The lockdown occurs simultaneously with the 
establishment of external triage capabilities. Performing a quick assessment of each 
patient’s condition provides the opportunity to filter the worried well out and identify 
patients that need immediate medical intervention. The worried well and lower acuity 
patients are placed in a queue for treatment, which may be several hours to several days 
depending upon the event. Federal law, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act 
(EMTALA), prohibits hospitals from turning patients away and refusing treatment (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2010). However, patients may be informed 
of alternative treatment sites for more rapid service, such as a clinic or temporary first aid 
station, where some level of care can be provided in a timelier manner. Higher acuity 
patients are typically admitted to the hospital before lower acuity patients or transferred 
to another facility that can provide appropriate care. 
The role that local EMS agencies are expected to play during disasters is unique 
and essential. As the responsibilities involve immediate and rapid care to the sick and 
injured, EMS plays a key part during the initial stages of disasters. The Target 
Capabilities List (U.S. Homeland Security Department, 2007, pp. 447–488) identifies 21 
specific mission types that fall into the Response Mission Capabilities arena. Of these 21,  
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three clearly are the primary responsibility of the LEMSA, which include: 1) emergency 
triage and pre-hospital treatment, 2) medical surge, and 3) medical supplies management 
and distribution. 
1. Measuring Preparedness in the Context of Emergency Management, 
Public Health, and Emergency Medical Services 
Much of the literature found regarding disaster preparedness is in the context of 
emergency management, which is a distinct and different professional discipline from 
public health and from emergency medical services. Persons employed by an emergency 
management agency or department are not typically affiliated or organizationally aligned 
with public health or EMS functions. Yet, many of the concepts of disaster preparedness 
relative to emergency management can also be applied to public health and EMS, or any 
government agency that has a role in disaster response. Inasmuch as EMS and emergency 
management have prominent roles in the operations divisions of an incident response 
(U.S. Homeland Security Department, 2004, pp. ESF#8–1), EMS and emergency 
management functions are similar in this regard. Further, the similarities in disaster 
response roles between EMS and public health are even stronger (U.S. Homeland 
Security Department, 2007, pp. 447–488). Many of the concepts found in the emergency 
management and public health literature apply to EMS.  
Although a great deal of information on measuring preparedness for the 
emergency management discipline and the public health discipline were found, few 
resources and literature were written about measuring preparedness in EMS. In the 
absence of many EMS-specific documents relative to measuring preparedness, it was 
necessary in the course of this research to rely upon research conducted for emergency 
management and public health, and attempt to draw conclusion based on the parts of 
those disciplines. Given similarities and common roles, lessons from these other 
disciplines might be applicable to and valid for EMS. 
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2. Measuring Preparedness Is Difficult 
One of the key challenges in measuring preparedness appears to be the lack of 
consistency or consensus in: 1) defining an emergency or disaster, 2) identifying 
competencies to measure, 3) determining data to be collected for measurements, and 4) 
selecting performance indicators. The inconsistencies are not solely within specific 
disciplines but are found across several disciplines. Problems in measuring preparedness 
are not based on the lack of creative measurements. Rather, in the case of public health, 
myriad measurement indicators exist; thereby, making it difficult for professionals within 
the discipline to reach consensus on a common set of appropriate measurements. 
An analysis performed by the RAND Corporation at the request of the National 
Defense Research Institute, concluded that disaster preparedness could not be measured 
without first standardizing measurements of organizations and communities (Davis, 
Mariano, Pace, Cotton, & Steinberg, 2006, p. 68). Accurate comparisons are not possible 
without standardized measurements, and comparisons are necessary to provide context to 
the measurement results. A separate RAND study found that policy makers and public 
health officials could not reach agreement as to how to measure public health emergency 
preparedness (Nelson, Lurie, Wasserman, Zakowski, & Leuschner, 2008, p. 1); 
nationwide consensus could not be reached. The lack of consensus on standardized 
measurements is a barrier to measuring disaster preparedness in public health, and this 
barrier will prevail until consensus on measurements can be reached (Nelson, Lurie, & 
Wasserman, 2007, p. 13). The lack of consensus does not seem to be limited to public 
health. Another RAND study ties the problem with lack of clear metrics to the fact that 
no clear performance standards exist by which to evaluate preparedness (Nelson, Lurie, 
& Wasserman, 2007, p. 10). A study from the University of Louisville determined that no 
single theory or set of theories existed for core concepts in disaster preparedness planning 
or practice; without a solid theoretical foundation in disaster preparedness planning, 
reaching consensus on measurements is problematic (Covington & Simpson, 2006, p. 3). 
In a study conducted by UCLA and RAND, researchers found that, “…although there are 
a multitude of instruments for measuring preparedness with a great deal of overlap in 
domains, there is little agreement about what actually constitutes preparedness or how it 
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should be measured.” (Asch, et al., 2005, p. 539) Struggles among professionals to define 
preparedness make an effort to measure it a moving target. A Congressional report also 
recognizes the difficulties in measuring preparedness. The report suggests the lack of 
consensus and definition may be solved with federal leadership in establishing definitions 
and measurements. However, even this report concludes that defining a baseline of 
preparedness for measurement purposes to be a “daunting challenge” (Canada, October 
2003). 
3. Ideas for Measuring Preparedness 
Although it has been established that measuring preparedness is difficult, it has 
also been established that measuring preparedness is necessary. The literature contains 
concepts and ideas for overcoming some of the problems identified above and for moving 
forward. 
One consistently repeated premise is that preparedness efforts cannot be 
successful unless consensus exists within the professional discipline being measured. 
Covington and Simpson offer the idea that key individuals in the disaster preparedness 
community need to come together and develop adequate measurements (Covington & 
Simpson, 2006, p. 23). Once consensus is reached among some key stakeholders within 
the discipline, the product can be introduced to policy makers for inclusion in legislation 
or grant guidance instructions. 
The concept was taken a step further. A report from 2008 described a project 
where public health experts were convened as a panel to: 1) define public health 
emergency preparedness, and 2) reach consensus on the broad elements that should be 
part of a preparedness plan (Nelson, Lurie, Wasserman, Zakowski, & Leuschner, 2008, p. 
11). Consensus was reached among the panelists on a definition of public health 
emergency preparedness, and the participants were hopeful that the definition could be 
used as a foundation for building standards and metrics in public health preparedness. 
Other literature citied previously also mentions the benefits and necessity of reaching 
consensus within disciplines on a basic set of goals and metrics. 
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Covington and Simpson also provide guidance for creating successful 
measurements. Data used to draw conclusions must be accurate and consistent; the data 
must be used to produce valid and reliable results; and stakeholders within the discipline 
must agree upon the data to be used (Covington & Simpson, 2006, p. 24). 
For most people and jurisdictions, disasters are rare occurrences. Building 
competency in responding to disasters can therefore be difficult because of the infrequent 
nature of performing disaster-related tasks. Low frequency, high consequence events 
require individuals to act regularly to avoid losing skills (Graham, 2002, p. 2). Several 
references in the literature suggest that disaster-related activities and skills somehow need 
to be incorporated into everyday tasks. Falkenrath refers to the concept as dual-use 
activities. His comments are in the context that federal grants attempting to achieve 
protection against weapons of mass destruction (WMD); actions by local governments to 
mitigate WMD must be the same actions required during daily routines so as not to lose 
the skills over time (Falkenrath, 2000, p. 25). In 2007, Nelson et al. terms the concept 
crosscutting capabilities, “those that are required to execute a broad spectrum of 
functions…efforts should be undertaken to identify routine proxies for key emergency 
response functions, perhaps resulting in some sort of national clearinghouse of embedded 
assessment templates and metrics” (Nelson, Lurie, & Wasserman, 2007, p. 13). The panel 
of public health experts studied by Nelson et al. in 2008 indicates that continuous 
changes in staffing through turnover and attrition require a continuous effort at 
preparedness. They conclude that the only practical method of remaining prepared for 
disasters is to integrate disaster functions into daily duties (Nelson, Lurie, Wasserman, 
Zakowski, & Leuschner, 2008, p. 9). The expert panel continues to indicate that creating 
special disaster-related duties works against achieving preparedness. New procedures for 
emergency situations should not be developed because they cannot possibly be 
effectively implemented during a crisis. 
One method used to build disaster preparedness competency in a public health 
setting was the development of a board game. Employees were rewarded for advancing 
down the path of preparedness, as depicted in the game (Parker, Barnett, Fews, Blodgett,  
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& Links, 2005, p. 505). The board game concept may build competency and awareness, 
but this approach does not incorporate activities into daily routines. Gained skills might 
diminish over time without repetition. 
As mentioned previously, the lack of consensus on what and how to measure 
preparedness is a pervasive problem in the emergency management and public health 
disciplines. One study suggests that perhaps each discipline develop a set of metrics 
unique to that discipline’s needs (Covington & Simpson, 2006, p. 11). Unique and 
specific measurements may provide a better opportunity towards achieving consensus 
while building a measurement framework relevant to the discipline. The Target 
Capability List is a comprehensive first attempt to define tasks for all phases of disaster 
preparedness for multiple disciplines (U.S. Homeland Security Department, 2007). 
4. Accuracy—Objective vs. Subjective Measurements 
Some of the difficulties in measuring preparedness have been identified, such as 
lack of consensus on data or measurement, lack of definitions, disagreements within 
disciplines on core principals and competencies, and so on. Further, the need for accurate 
data has been identified as being important for successfully measuring preparedness. Yet, 
the literature seems to indicate that purely objective measurements are elusive. Some 
suggest that subjective measurements will always be part of disaster preparedness. 
Covington and Simpson state, “all indicators, no matter how scientific, contain a 
degree of subjectivity and values.” In fact, the authors place a great deal of significance 
in the opinion of experts, stating that practitioner experience and expertise will be 
valuable in building disaster preparedness metrics (Covington & Simpson, 2006, p. 26). 
As the development of measuring preparedness is fairly new, sources of data are 
not readily available to rely upon for research. When data is not obtainable, researchers 
must gather expert judgments and opinions. Often, data is self-reported (Jackson, 2008, p. 
22). Consequently, it is sometimes necessary to rely not only upon the opinions of 
experts, but those same experts may be offering opinions as to their own level of 
preparedness. It may be necessary to accept a certain amount of bias in the study of  
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preparedness. Asch et a.l offer a similar opinion when suggesting that the lack of 
evidence forces reliance on expert opinion. They further propose an expert opinion may 
be better than nothing, but a truly objective measure is best (Asch et al., 2005, p. 539). 
The literature indicates that it is impossible to have 100 percent accuracy with a 
disaster preparedness measurement model. However, the lack of pure accuracy is not the 
biggest problem. Rather, the greatest problem is the failure to reach consensus on which 
metrics to use (Covington & Simpson, 2006, p. 27).  
5. Leadership from the Federal Level 
Given the seeming lack of progress towards consensus on definitions, goals, and 
measures of preparedness, many references in the literature suggest the federal 
government lead the effort to establish consistent standards and definitions. 
Establishment of standards by local and state governments would be too fragmented, and 
achieving consistency would remain a daunting task. As the federal government is the 
common denominator to all jurisdictions in the nation, many of the resources conclude 
the federal government is the logical entity for addressing the problem of measuring 
preparedness.  
In 2000, Falkenrath described the nation’s preparedness efforts as a bottom-up 
rather than top-down approach; meaning the federal government did not have a guiding 
strategy for preparedness (Falkenrath, 2000, p. 4). While some looked to FEMA as the 
agency most likely to lead efforts in preparedness, budgetary decisions and dynamics 
associated with perceived competition against the Department of Defense prevented 
FEMA from taking this role. Prior to 9/11, Simpson states, “…the U.S. domestic 
preparedness program was composed of multiple loosely coupled component programs”; 
the programs were highly fragmented (Simpson, 2004, p. 10).  
Asch et al. attempted to define the federal government’s role in establishing 
accountability standards for using preparedness grant monies appropriately. They purport 
that it is difficult to hold a local government accountable for meeting specific 
preparedness standards when grant monies are distributed based on politics rather than 
demonstrated need. Moreover, the federal and state governments’ inability to articulate 
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their own accountability standards make it impossible for local governments to establish 
such standards (Asch et al., 2005, p. 540). The federal government must take the lead in 
setting such standards for all other levels of government to follow. 
In 2007, Nelson et al. stressed the need for metrics based on exercises and drills. 
Standards developed at the national level avoid the fragmentation of states attempting to 
establish exercise metrics. However, the clear standards expected by Nelson et al. would 
be that the federal government establish desired outcomes, yet leave the flexibility to 
states and locals to determine how to achieve the outcomes creatively (Nelson, Lurie, & 
Wasserman, 2007, p. 12). Moreover, federal funding should be contingent upon evidence 
of a relationship between desired outcomes and the structure of public health 
preparedness (Nelson, Lurie, & Wasserman, 2007, p. 7). By 2008, one group was urging 
the federal government to, “make national preparedness an urgent priority, particularly 
public health and medical readiness” (Center for American Progress, 2008, p. 1). 
Testimony before the House of Representative Subcommittee on Homeland 
Security, Committee on Appropriations, by William O. Jenkins, director Homeland 
Security and Justice Issues, General Accountability Office given in 2008, was critical of 
Department of Homeland Security’s ability to measure the nation’s preparedness. It was 
noted that DHS’ grant programs did not have strong accountability components; the 
federal government could not determine if states and local governments were building 
preparedness capabilities, or to what extent capabilities had been affected or improved 
(Jenkins, 2008, p. 5). Further, the GAO criticized DHS for not having the means to 
measure program outcomes (Jenkins, 2008, p. 18). The criticism may be too harsh; the 
literature seems to suggest that no one has yet to develop a means of measuring 
preparedness acceptable to all stakeholders; consensus remains difficult to achieve. 
6. Federal Actions 
Action taken by President Bush in 2003 with issuance of HSPD-8 was a 
substantial commitment by the federal government to assume a leadership role in disaster 
preparedness (The White House, 2003). The National Preparedness Guidelines (NPG), 
developed as a direct result of HSPD-8, are intended to organize and synchronize all 
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levels of government in preparedness efforts and guide investments in national 
preparedness. Further, the NPG is intended to establish readiness metrics to measure 
progress and a system for assessing the nation’s overall preparedness (U.S. Homeland 
Security Department, 2007). 
Within the umbrella of the National Preparedness Guidelines, two key 
components have been developed, the Universal Task List (U.S. Homeland Security 
Department, 2004) and Target Capabilities List (U.S. Homeland Security Department, 
2007). Both attempt to provide standards and metrics for multiple aspects and disciplines 
of disaster preparedness. Some have identified weaknesses in these measurements. 
Jackson indicates that many of the items on the Target Capability List are simply 
checklists. Further, Jackson argues that checklists are not adequate because they mainly 
assess quantity but do not measure the nuances of quality (Jackson, 2008, p. 7).  
The elements of the Target Capabilities List most applicable to EMS are: 1) 
emergency triage and pre-hospital treatment, 2) medical surge, and 3) medical supplies 
management and distribution. Each element contains a list of preparedness measures. The 
measures are in a format similar to a checklist, and the measures range from very specific 
to very broad. For example, a performance measure in the Emergency Triage and Pre-
hospital Treatment element specified, “recall procedures to summon off-duty EMS 
personnel when needed are in place” (U.S. Homeland Security Department, 2007, p. 
438). This is a vague measurement, but it can be answered as yes or no. A more specific 
example is, “all cities have a minimum of one spare ALS [advanced life support] vehicle 
available” (U.S. Homeland Security Department, 2007, p. 438). This preparedness 
measurement is much more narrowly defined, but one must question the validity of the 
measurement. The availability of one additional ambulance for Los Angeles, New York, 
Chicago, or even Bakersfield, seems to be an insignificant contribution to a disastrous 
event. The concept of the preparedness measures in the Target Capabilities List by 
function is a beneficial first step, but each measurement will likely need refinement. 
Before the list can be deemed a valid indicator of achieving the outcomes communities 
expect of disaster preparedness efforts, more study is necessary. 
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7. Gaps in the Literature 
No definitive listing of preparedness measurements have been encountered in the 
literature representing competencies in EMS, that when implemented, will result in 
specific expected outcomes from a LEMSA’s response to a disaster. Most of the literature 
on measuring medical preparedness is in the context of emergency management or public 
health. Very little EMS-specific information is available. Of the small amount of EMS 
information found, most pertained to field operations; even less was available on the 
administration of the EMS system or LEMSA. As a LEMSA plays a key role in the 
support of the EMS system and support of emergency medical operations, a gap exists in 
the literature for this niche sub-discipline. 
Specific core competencies for LEMSAs must be developed. Ideally, upon 
mastering the core competencies, the LEMSAs will be able to provide the support to the 
EMS system needed to address the most probable disaster situations. Much of the 
problem experienced by the public health discipline in measuring preparedness is based 
on the inability to reach consensus on: 1) defining an emergency or disaster, 2) 
identifying competencies to measure, 3) determining data to be collected for 
measurements, and 4) selecting performance indicators. Using this knowledge to avoid 
repeating past failure, the development of these four elements and attempting to achieve 
consensus among the LEMSA administrator discipline may be worthy of further study. 
Simpson argues that defining a disaster is an essential component to 
understanding how to measure preparedness (Simpson, 2004, p. 2). The argument has 
merit inasmuch as solving a problem is likely going to be easier with an understanding of 
the root causes of the problem. Jackson offers that three pieces of information are needed 
to define emergency preparedness: 1) identify the type of damage; 2) identify actions 
needed in response to damage; and 3) identify the capabilities and resources needed to 
conduct the response (Jackson, 2008, p. 3). Simpson and Jackson seem to be after the 
same concept, which is to break the problem into smaller parts to facilitate an 
understanding of the problem, which in turn, leads to possible solutions. 
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One of the fundamental questions asked by Jackson is, “how confident should we 
be that the systems we have put into place to respond to damaging events will be able to 
deliver when we call upon them?” (Jackson, 2008, p. 11). With respect to LEMSAs, the 
answer to this question today is that confidence is low. The absence of basic definitions 
and the absence of preparedness measurements coupled with little effort to achieve 
consensus on these matters indicates that research is needed in this field. 
8. Funding 
A recent Naval Postgraduate School thesis (Donnelly, 2007) suggests that 
capabilities-based assessments are the foundation of planning, yet no national standards 
in various homeland security programs for performing such assessments exist. Of the 
capability-based assessments created, there is no nexus to funding. Without the 
correlation, it is difficult to understand the extent to which the investment in homeland 
security is moving the nation towards meeting preparedness goals (Donnelly Sr., 2007).  
Issues related to funding and measuring preparedness are relevant in three 
important ways. First, government leaders and the public want bureaucracies at all levels 
of government to be held accountable for using appropriations as intended (Woodbury, 
2005, p. 1). According to the GAO, grant programs administered by the Department of 
Homeland Security do not have strong accountability components (Jenkins, 2008, p. 5). 
This may be due to the difficulty in measuring preparedness. However, the lack of 
accountability for building preparedness capabilities leaves decision makers not knowing 
if policies are effective or if policies should be changed (Jenkins, 2008, p. 5). 
Development of nationwide preparedness standards including development of a baseline 
could lead to greater accountability.  
Second, future investments in preparedness and homeland security can be guided 
using the results of performance measurements and capability assessments (Woodbury, 
2005, p. 1). Having a set of performance measures could provide Congress and federal 
agencies a means of gauging effectiveness of new preparedness programs (Canada, 
October 2003). A considerable amount of tax dollars have been spent on disaster 
preparedness. Yet, it is not possible to demonstrate definitively that the investment has 
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been worthwhile; developing accountability for expenditure of grant funds/tax money 
may be possible through preparedness measurements (Nelson, Lurie, & Wasserman, 
2007, p. 2). 
Third, it is difficult to demonstrate effectiveness at protecting the nation and for 
accomplishing the goals intended to be achieved without some accepted and recognized 
method of measuring results (Woodbury, 2005, p. 1). Organizations using a recognized 
evidenced-based measurement tool may discover gaps exist in their preparedness efforts. 
Identifying the strengths and weakness, or gaps, of an organization’s preparedness 
capability may facilitate resilience of that organization or community. According to a 
congressional report, measuring preparedness facilitates improvements in response 
capabilities and intergovernmental coordination, and identifying gaps serves to promote 
long-term sustained preparedness (Canada, October 2003). It is difficult to determine the 
validity and weaknesses of local emergency plans unless a standardized method to 
measure preparedness is employed (Simpson, 2004, pp. 3–4). Moreover, measuring 
preparedness in a standardized manner allows one community to be compared to another. 
Such a comparison provides a greater understanding and context of preparedness 
strengths and weaknesses (Covington & Simpson, 2006, p. 6). If measuring preparedness 
provides knowledge and this information is used to mitigate legitimate preparedness 
weaknesses, then proper fact-based decisions may produce more resilient communities 
(Covington & Simpson, 2006, p. 6). 
Ultimately, the level of preparedness and the amount of funding devoted to 
preparedness is a local decision. Local jurisdictions decide how much of the local funding 
resources will be used for preparedness, and local jurisdictions will decide if participation 
in a federal grant program is worth the responsibility of meeting the federal mandates 
associated with the funding.  
Not all states, counties, cities, and tribal entities may want to achieve the level of 
preparedness that a neighboring jurisdiction has achieved. More important issues other 
than disaster preparedness may first need to be addressed to meet local needs. It is 
incumbent upon local policy makers to establish priorities for use of resources (Errea,  
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2008, p. 14). Measuring preparedness may allow more informed decisions to be made. 
By understanding the extent to which a jurisdiction is prepared compared to others 
provides a context for making wise resource allocation choices. 
Funding is an important aspect to successful preparedness; resources must be 
devoted to preparedness efforts to maintain readiness and skills. Similarly, appropriate 
and sustained funding is a key component to providing an EMS system possessing the 
capability to respond to a community’s disasters. Competing for scarce local resources or 
federal grant funding will perhaps have greater credibility and stronger justification if 
results can be demonstrated to policy makers and the public. In the absence of actual 
performance during a disaster, which is a rare event, development of a method for 
measuring preparedness can be an appropriate substitute to demonstrate strengths, 
weaknesses, and capabilities of a system. Yet, a review of the literature indicates that no 
widely accepted or highly refined measures of preparedness for EMS exists. 
Consequently, EMS administrators do not have accepted or recognized tools available for 
identifying the appropriate level of EMS system disaster preparedness for the 
communities and jurisdiction being served. In the absence of such tools or methods, it is 
difficult to prove that existing systems’ capabilities are adequate or inadequate. EMS 
plays a crucial role in saving lives and reducing suffering, including during disasters. 
Building a methodology or tool to measure preparedness may be beneficial, if system 
weaknesses can be identified and mitigated before a disaster occurs. 
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III. HYPOTHESIS 
Defining and measuring preparedness can seem difficult and complex, and 
measuring a LEMSA’s level of preparedness is likely to be challenging. Yet, it is 
important and necessary to measure a LEMSA’s level of preparedness. It is possible and 
practical to define the skills and equipment1 that a LEMSA will need to perform strategic 
disaster response duties common to most if not all types of disasters. Once the common 
duties are defined and understood, it is possible to define performance indicators that can 
confirm that a LEMSA’s preparatory actions are sufficient to fulfill its disaster response 
role. 
The literature indicates no nationally recognized or generally accepted 
measurements exist for assessing a LEMSA’s level of preparedness for disasters. The 
public health and emergency management disciplines have been plagued by a lack of 
consensus defining a disaster and defining preparedness, which has led to the absence of 
accepted or recognized measurements. Consensus has not been reached on selecting 
performance indicators and the data to be collected for measuring preparedness. 
Similarly, identifying the common capabilities that a LEMSA must possess to 
appropriately function during a disaster remains undefined.  
Reasons for measuring preparedness levels are numerous, as identified in the 
literature. Measurements provide the opportunity to identify strengths and weaknesses of 
a jurisdiction’s readiness. Once gaps in preparedness are known, actions can be taken to 
mitigate the problem areas. Additionally, if gaps are found in a jurisdiction’s 
preparedness efforts, such a finding from a recognized and uniform measurement process 
might be used as evidence to request the reallocation of funding to resolve the issue. 
                                                 
1 Consensus has not been reached on defining a disaster and defining preparedness in the EMS 
discipline. Further, identifying the common capabilities that a local EMS agency must possess to 
appropriately function during a disaster remains undefined. Consensus has not been reached on selecting 
performance indicators and the data to be collected for measuring preparedness. To narrow the scope of this 
thesis and make it possible to complete this thesis within the allotted time, the research was narrowed to 
skills and equipment. Processes to use the equipment were not included in the study. 
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Measuring preparedness provides a means to hold jurisdictions accountable for 
the use of federal preparedness grant funds. Policy makers and the public want assurance 
that taxpayer money is being used wisely and efficiently. According to the GAO’s 
testimony before a Congressional subcommittee, approximately $20 billion in grant funds 
were awarded to states and local governments for emergency preparedness between 2002 
and 2007; about one-third of these funds were unspent as of January 2008 (Jenkins, 
2008). Accountability is important for continued support for similar grant programs. 
Measuring change in preparedness and having the ability to demonstrate that progress is 
being made provides accountability.  
Further, by measuring preparedness, the policy doctrine that serves as the basis 
for preparedness grant funding can be tested for validity. The value and success of a 
policy initiative can be determined, and measurements can provide evidence to continue 
or discontinue a program. For example, if federal grant funding is used by local 
jurisdictions for disaster preparedness, it should be possible through standardized 
measurements to demonstrate that certain preparedness benchmarks have been achieved. 
If a majority of those jurisdictions is unable to meet the preparedness benchmarks, it may 
be an indicator that the policy is flawed or unrealistic. 
Measuring jurisdictions with the same preparedness standards provides the 
opportunity for comparisons; a context is provided in which to determine if one town is 
more prepared or less prepared than another. Comparisons of preparedness levels can be 
important in assessing risk and threats. Those jurisdictions that choose to make heavy 
investments and commitments to disaster preparedness may be more resilient. The 
consequences of a disastrous event may be lower than a community that has not made the 
same investments and commitments. Further, distribution of grant funds or use of local 
tax dollars might be affected in regards to risk and quantifying preparedness. 
Evidence that underscores the importance of measuring preparedness includes 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 8 (The White House, 2003), which 
emanated from weaknesses apparent in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. HSPD-8 ordered that a 
system for measuring preparedness be developed. Beyond terrorist attacks, natural 
disasters also pose threats to this nation. The failed preparedness components to 
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Hurricane Katrina at all levels of government and the resulting devastation to New 
Orleans and other gulf areas establish a need to measure preparedness. Had policy makers 
at the federal, state, and local level known the real state of preparedness in New Orleans, 
perhaps actions and interventions could have taken place sooner to mitigate or prevent 
many of the problems that did occur. 
Further, evidence that measuring a LEMSA’s level of preparedness is a practical 
endeavor appears in a report from a summit held in June 2007 to discuss lessons learned 
from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. State EMS officials from throughout the nation 
developed a consensus report on conceptually defining the EMS discipline’s response 
capabilities at a national level (National Association of State Emergency Medical 
Services Officials, 2008). Although the context of the report is for a national response, 
many of the concepts can be applied to a LEMSA. The inability of the public health and 
emergency management disciplines to achieve national consensus on defining 
preparedness has been a major obstacle in measuring preparedness; NASEMSO’s 
Consensus Report may be the tool to remove the obstacle in the EMS discipline.  
It is appropriate to note that although National Association of State EMS Officials 
(NASEMSO) did reach consensus at the national level on six common disaster 
preparedness themes (National Association of State Emergency Medical Services 
Officials, 2008), these may or may not represent consensus among LEMSAs. People 
working in EMS administration at the state level have a different perspective, different 
demands, and different goals than LEMSAs. The local level is often at the front line of a 
disaster, whereas state officials must not always be forced to deal with the consequences 
of a disaster on a local community. The variance in roles between state and local 
jurisdictions cause the needs and realities to be different. Consequently, one can argue 
that consensus among all 50 state-level EMS leaders does not necessarily represent 
consensus on the same issues at the local level. In this author’s experience and 
observations, rarely does 100 percent support exist among LEMSAs in California for 
every action taken by the state EMS agency. However, for purposes of this thesis, it will 
be assumed that the consensus reached by NASEMSO is applicable to the local level and 
does represent general support among LEMSAs for the disaster preparedness concepts. 
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Woodbury presents additional evidence that measuring preparedness is possible 
and practical. He demonstrates through examples the ability to measure preparedness 
through modeling, breaking complex parts into components, and he shows examples of 
using outputs to measure outcomes (Woodbury, 2005). 
Evidence does exist to support the premise that disaster preparedness can and 
should be measured, as presented above. Yet, opposing opinions regarding measuring 
preparedness have surfaced in the literature. One argument against measuring 
preparedness is that establishing a baseline could pose a significant financial burden on 
states and localities and interfere with local priorities (Canada, October 2003). By using a 
disaster preparedness measurement as a national yardstick in making value judgments of 
the preparedness of a community, pressure may be brought to bear on local leaders to 
shift priorities and resources to meet some kind of national standard. It is plausible that 
high priority local needs, such as repairing a leaky roof at a senior center, can be 
overridden to achieve preparedness standards. Measuring disaster preparedness may 
place local policy makers in the position of weighing local priorities against national 
priorities, and in doing so, reallocate resources that might otherwise have been used to 
improve the quality of life. For purposes of this thesis, it is assumed that the advantages 
of measuring disaster preparedness outweigh the disadvantages. Although additional 
information may complicate local policy decisions, the consequences of not having 
enough information can be even more detrimental. 
Clovis found that federal homeland security grant accountability had become 
more important and required more time and effort than achieving the actual homeland 
security goals (Clovis, 2006, p. 13). If measuring disaster preparedness for purposes of 
grant accountability becomes so burdensome that it hampers the purpose of the program, 
then obviously change is needed. It is important to develop meaningful yet not overly 




As found through the literature review, academic resources about disaster 
preparedness for the emergency medical services discipline are not widely available. 
Even fewer references and published reports exist for the secondary support role that 
local emergency medical services agencies or like-organizations play in response to 
disasters. Consequently, the method used to examine the topic in more detail necessitates 
gathering information from people through surveys and conversations. 
Research conducted for this thesis can be classified as qualitative. Although a 
normative survey was conducted for part of this research and those results can be 
quantified, the most meaningful information was gathered through person-to-person 
interviews and conversations. A phenomenological study was used to understand the 
perceptions and perspectives of people performing EMS support duties during disasters 
or mass-casualty events (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 139). Lengthy interviews using 
open-ended questions were conducted with 10 people from across the nation possessing 
experience responding to at least one type of disaster. The type and magnitudes of 
disasters varied significantly. 
The phenomenological study was used because this research method focused on 
studying human events, interpersonal relationships, and creative problem solving (Leedy 
& Ormrod, 2005, p. 133). It is appropriate in this type of study for the researcher to 
interpret responses from the interviews and attempt to understand any social phenomenon 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 133). Through analysis of the data collected through this 
method, the researcher was searching for any commonalities and stark differences in 
regards to skills and equipment used in the disaster response between the interviewees. It 
was anticipated that such a study might “…reveal the nature of these multiple 
perspectives” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 133).  
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B. RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS AND EVENTS 
Many disasters have occurred throughout the nation. Core LEMSA disaster 
response functions were performed for many if not all of these disasters. If past success is 
a reliable predictor for performing the same functions in the future successfully, it is 
relevant to discover the aspects of the past actions that contributed toward success. This 
research attempted to solicit information from people possessing such first-hand 
experience.  
People targeted for interviews, the research participants, were screened to ensure 
they had first-hand experience in responding to a disaster or other non-routine multi-
casualty event. The people interviewed for this research project were directly involved in 
performing or supporting the following broad EMS activities (California Emergency 
Medical Services Authority, 2003). 
• Assessment of Immediate Medical and Health Needs 
• Coordination of Patient Distribution and Medical Evacuation 
• Coordination of Disaster Medical and Health Resources 
After the invitations to participate in the research were distributed, and the 
respondents were screened to ensure the inclusion parameters were met, a final list of 
disasters and participants was developed. EMS people involved in the events shown in 
Table 4-1 were included in the study and interviewed. 
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Table 4–1. List of Disasters and Participants Included in the Study 
The eleven disasters included in the study offer a wide range of event types. Four 
events are natural disasters (two wildfires, earthquake, landslide); three events involve 
various commercial vehicle accidents (train, bus, airplane); two events were intentional, 
man-made crimes (terrorism, active shooter); and the remaining two events were 
accidental engineering failures (bridge collapse and air conditioning failure). Most of the 
events occurred within the past 10 years, but one event occurred 29 years ago, in 1981. 
Geographically, eight of the 11 events included in the study occurred in California. Only 
three events included in this study occurred in states other than California, two in 
Virginia, and one in Missouri. There was not as great of diversity in national geography 
as originally envisioned in the study design, and this might be considered a weakness in 
the data when trying to develop findings that could be applied throughout the nation. 
Clearly, the data is heavily drawn from California. This is partly because the researcher is 
an EMS official in California. Gaining access to colleagues and counterparts in other 
areas of California was not as difficult as seeking cooperation from strangers in other  
 
Type of Event Event Name Location Date of Event Title of Study Participant 
bridge collapse Hyatt-Regency sky bridge  
Kansas City, 
Missouri July 17, 1981 EMS Director 
airplane 
accident Alaska Air 261 crash Ventura, CA January 31, 2000 EMS Coordinator 
terrorism 9/11 Pentagon attack Arlington, Virginia September 11, 2001 Asst. Fire Chief, EMS Division 
earthquake San Simeon San Luis Obispo, CA December 22, 2003 
EMS Agency 
Director 




Center Stockton, CA July 23, 2006 
EMS 
Administrator 
active shooter Virginia Tech shootings 
Blacksburg, 




wildfire San Diego firestorms San Diego, CA October 2007 Chief of EMS 






Bus Crash Soledad, CA April 28, 2009 
EMS Agency 
Director 
wildfire Jesusita Fire Santa Barbara, CA May 2009 EMS Agency Director 
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states. Nonetheless, it can be argued that the method of EMS response to disasters in 
California is not radically different than it is throughout the rest of the nation. If true, then 
the conclusions of this study may be applicable to most if not all other states.  
Additionally, each person needed to have performed at least one of 27 different 
core EMS disaster response roles to be included in the study (California Emergency 
Medical Services Authority, 2003). Table 4-2 shows the 27 core EMS disaster response 
roles.2  
Obtaining information from people with first-hand relevant experience is 
presumed to provide unique and informed perspectives of the skills and equipment most 
useful in disaster response. As Leedy and Ormrod state, “by looking at multiple 
perspectives of the same situation, the researcher can then make some generalizations of 
‘what something is like’ from an insider’s perspective” (p. 139). The researcher invited 
LEMSA administrators, LEMSA medical directors, LEMSA staff members, state EMS 
representatives, and field responders engaged with a LEMSA’s response activity from 
organizations that have mounted actual disaster responses to participate in the study.  
 
                                                 
2 Not all 27 roles will be performed directly by the LEMSA. Rather, the LEMSA is responsible for 
coordinating with other entities to ensure the roles are performed. Many of the responsibilities of a LEMSA 
are accomplished by delegating tasks to EMS system providers. For example, Function No. 1 in part states, 
“initiate recall to staff spare ambulances.” In practice, a LEMSA would likely delegate this task to an 
ambulance company. The LEMSA’s task would be to ensure that it was done. 
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Table 4–2. List of Core EMS Disaster Response Functions (From: California 
Emergency Medical Services Authority, 2003) 
Ten interviews were conducted for the 11 events shown in Table 4-1. The 
respondent for the San Simeon earthquake and the Highway 101/Soledad Bus Crash is 
the same person. Tom Lynch was employed in the counties where these two events 
occurred about six years apart. Each of these 11 disasters or non-routine multi-casualty 
events involved an EMS response and required the performance of many of the common 
and core EMS disaster response functions. Table 4-2 lists the core EMS disaster response 
 
Assessment of Immediate Medical and Health Needs 
  
1. Activation of the Disaster Medical and Health System and notification of key positions; initiate recall to staff 
spare ambulances and provide immediate surge capability 
2. Transformation of pre-hospital system to disaster status 
3. Activate medical surge plans, procedures, and protocols 
4. Establish effective, reliable interoperable communications between EMS, incident command, public health, and 
healthcare facilities 
5. Develop situation status information and report status to appropriate channels/levels 
  
Coordination of Patient Distribution and Medical Evacuation 
  
6. Coordinate triage and pre-hospital treatment operations with on-site Incident Command 
7. Manage pre-hospital patient distribution and patient tracking 
8. Coordinate the establishment of temporary Field Treatment Sites (FTS); designate, manage and support FTS 
9. Manage facility-to-facility transfers (interfacility transfers) 
10. Coordinate the evacuation from damaged or overwhelmed medical facilities 
11. Activate alternative care sites and overflow emergency medical care facilities to manage hospital surge 
capacity 
12. Coordinate evacuation of casualties to outside the area if the local capacity were exceeded 
13. Coordinate receiving of casualties from other jurisdictions (providing mutual aid) 
  
Coordination of Disaster Medical and Health Resources 
  
14. Maintain an EMS resource inventory for the system 
15. Track use and assignments of personnel, equipment, and other non-disposable medical resources 
16. Provide medical support, safety considerations, and PPE for EMS responders and hospitals 
17. Assess need for additional medical resources (mutual aid) 
18. Ability to acquire, allocate, mobilize, and support additional resources (mutual aid) 
19. Activate healthcare workers’ and volunteers’ call systems 
20. Manage support to hospitals; ensure adequacy of medical equipment and supplies in support of immediate 
medical response operations and for restocking supplies/equipment requested 
21. Coordinate acquisition of private source medical supplies 
22. Manage support to other health facilities; coordinate with alternative emergency medical providers (clinics, 
skilled nursing facilities) 
23. Monitor supply usage and stockpile levels of health facilities, mass prophylaxis sites, and other critical care 
venues; process and manage requests for additional medical supply personnel or equipment 
24. Request Strategic National Stockpile assets from Centers for Disease Control 
25. Ensure the timely provision of medical supplies to shelters and mass care and medical facilities 
26. Provide personnel for shelters and mass care and medical facilities 
27. Implement austere medical care standards, as appropriate, to manage mass casualty events  
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functions. Given the wide range of event types, finding commonalities in the types of 
skills and equipment used to mount a successful response may be a significant finding. 
The information obtained through the stories told by these people with first-hand 
experience is compelling, important, and useful. 
C. DATA COLLECTION—SURVEY AND INTERVIEW 
The survey used in this study contained two distinct parts. The first part consisted 
of 27 statements representing the core EMS disaster response functions (California 
Emergency Medical Services Authority, 2003). See Table 4-2. Participants were 
instructed to select all items from the list they performed during their event. These series 
of closed-ended questions served two purposes, to validate that EMS functions actually 
performed, and to determine if some of the core functions were common among the 
various types of events. 
The second part of the survey consisted of nine open-ended essay questions, 
which formed the basis for interviews. Verbal interviews were conducted over the 
telephone with eight of the 10 participants. The conservations were recorded and later 
transcribed into text. Two of the participants opted to provide written responses to the 
essay questions in lieu of an interview. Appendix A contains a list of all of the survey 
questions.  
Questions were developed to ignite a conversation about the event and each 
agency’s role and successes. An appreciative inquiry (Barrett & Fry, 2008) line of 
questioning was used to focus the participant on the positive aspects of the jurisdiction’s 
efforts and identify the skills and equipment essential in making the disaster response 
effective. The theory behind appreciative inquiry is to emphasize what might be or 
should be possible to achieve. The method does not attempt to identify and focus efforts 
on solving past shortcomings; fixing past failures only incrementally improves the 
existing process (Barrett & Fry, 2008). Appreciative inquiry is intended to spark 
creativity by envisioning future possibilities; thereby, moving an organization beyond 
just incremental improvement of the status quo. The application of appreciative inquiry 
to these preparedness problems is novel. 
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Focusing the study on past failures or areas of a response that need improvement 
limits what can be achieved. Fixing the existing problems will only result in achieving 
the status quo, at best. If all possible problems can be fixed, thereby resulting in a near 
perfect response effort during the next event, the responding agency can only achieve the 
level of success known today. Appreciative inquiry makes it possible to imagine what 
might be (Barrett & Fry, 2008). Articulating and envisioning a higher level of success 
provides response organizations the possibility of achieving more. 
In addition to the advantages of the appreciative inquiry method advocated by 
Barrett and Fry, the approach provided participants a measure of ease. By focusing on the 
successful parts of the EMS response, and not focusing on failures, participants were 
likely to provide candid answers to the interview questions. One participant commented 
that he would not have participated in this study if the research method focused on 
failures and shortcomings of the response. Using the appreciative inquiry approach 
facilitated access to knowledge held by an emergency responder that otherwise would not 
have been available to the researcher. 
D. DATA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
As mentioned, the verbal interviews were recorded and transcribed into text. Each 
interview was transcribed word-for-word as recorded, resulting in 43 single-spaced pages 
of transcripts. A four-step data analysis process described by Leedy and Ormrod (p. 140) 
was used for this study. Step 1—Transcripts were reviewed multiple times and statements 
relating to skills and equipment used in the response effort were identified; this was a 
manual search for similar themes. Step 2—Relevant statements containing similar 
meanings or themes were then categorized. The initial categories identified were as 
follows. 
• Most Valuable Skills 
• Situational Awareness 
• Relationships 
• ICS/NIMS, Mutual Aid 
• Confidence 
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• Devine Intervention (the unexplainable) 
• Three Wishes for the Future 
• Tools and Equipment 
• Personal Challenges and Difficulties 
• Accomplishments/Outcomes 
Step 3—The researcher used interpretive skills to understand the various ways 
people experienced the disaster response activities. Again, commonalities were identified 
in an attempt to define the most prevalent themes in the categories. Step 4—A composite 
was constructed from the analyzed and interpreted data to describe the skills and 
equipment needed to perform EMS roles successfully during a disaster. 
Any time data is analyzed and interpreted, bias must be considered a factor in the 
researcher’s conclusions (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 208). It is acknowledged that this 
research is unlikely to be free from bias. Interviews were more than words transcribed on 
a page; they were conversations. The conversations were undoubtedly influenced by the 
researcher’s and participants’ tone of voice, personalities, and interaction. Reading the 
transcripts to identify statements relevant to the research involved interpretation and 
judgment by the researcher. Further, the researcher had no personal first-hand experience 
with disaster response, and the lack of experience may color the way participants’ 
statements were interpreted. No effort was made to select a sample size of events (11) 
and participants (10) to interview that could be considered statistically significant. 
Rather, the number of interviews was based more on convenience and availability. It is 
likely impossible to conduct qualitative research without inherent risks of personal bias; 
the results and findings of this research undeniably contain some influence of bias. Yet, 
every effort was made by the researcher to interpret and analyze the data objectively. 
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V. OVERVIEW OF EVENTS, ACTIVITIES, 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS, AND CHALLENGES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As detailed in the methodology chapter, the process and structure of the research 
has been documented. Chapter V provides some detail about each disaster event. To 
understand the findings of this research better, it is important to understand the context 
with which disaster is used and defined in this study. A brief description of each disaster 
event included in this research follows. Descriptions were assembled from interview 
transcripts, newspaper articles, and other reports and publications. Where possible, 
descriptions of the activities, accomplishments, and challenges facing the EMS personnel 
are given. Events are listed chronologically from oldest to most recent. See Table 5-1. 
Understanding the setting of each disaster and understanding the challenges each 
person performing the LEMSA duties faced is important background information. This 
knowledge helps to grasp how and why certain skills and tools were used in the response. 
Further, it helps to illustrate how specific activities led to accomplishments. Chapter V 
builds the background information that leads to the findings identified in Chapter VI. 
 
Event Name Location Date of Event 
Hyatt-Regency Sky Bridges  Kansas City, MO July 17, 1981 
Alaska Air 261 crash Ventura, CA January 31, 2000 
9/11 Pentagon attack Arlington, VA September 11, 2001 
San Simeon earthquake San Luis Obispo, CA December 22, 2003 
La Conchita landslide La Conchita, CA January 10, 2005 
Beverly Healthcare Center Stockton, CA July 23, 2006 
Virginia Tech shootings Blacksburg, VA April 16, 2007 
San Diego firestorms San Diego, CA October 2007 
Chatsworth Train Collision Chatsworth, CA September 12, 2008 
Hwy 101/Soledad Bus Crash Soledad, CA April 28, 2009 
Jesusita Fire Santa Barbara, CA May 2009 
Table 5–1. List of Disasters Included in the Study 
 40
1. Hyatt-Regency Sky Bridges Collapse 
Kansas City, Missouri, July 17, 1981—Louis Cox, director of emergency medical 
services in Blue Springs, Missouri, acting director of Mid-America Regional Council for 
Emergency Rescue (MARCER) 
According to Robert Price, reporter for the Bakersfield Californian newspaper 
who interviewed Louis Cox years after the disastrous event (Price, 2006),  
Cox…worked the scene of what was then one of the country's most 
horrific high-rise accidents. Cox was the director of emergency medical 
services in Blue Springs, Mo., when on July 17, 1981, he was summoned 
to the 40-story Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Mo. Two ‘sky 
bridges’ crowded with people had collapsed into the hotel's six-story 
lobby, where 1,500 people partied at a Friday-night ‘tea dance.’ Some 114 
people died; scores were injured, many grievously. ‘People would dance 
on these catwalks, and that night they just came down, one on top of the 
other,’ Cox said. 
 
Figure 5–1. Hyatt-Regency Skywalk Collapse (From: Ford, 2006) 
One hundred and thirteen people were killed, and 174 people were transported by 
ambulance with injuries ranging from very critical to moderate (L. Cox, personal 
communication, May 21, 2010). When asked about the EMS organization’s 
accomplishments that night, Cox said, “we got people moved, we got people to hospitals 
safely, we saved lives, and we reduced suffering; that's the part we played” (L. Cox, 
personal communication, May 21, 2010). The most prevalent threat to this part of 
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Missouri came from tornados. Consequently, all of the emergency response agencies had 
exercised and planned for a tornado event (L. Cox, personal communication, May 21, 
2010). Cox said,  
No one had planned for this type of disaster. You can see the people 
trapped under the concrete, you could see the people trapped, and they 
were trying to use forklifts but they weren't moving any concrete at all. 
They were trying to use butter, they were trying to use grease, they were 
trying to use anything they could to dislodge them from under the 
concrete. They tried a lot of things to get people out of there. There was a 
man trapped that thought he was going to die, so they got a chainsaw and 
they cut his leg off with a chainsaw. (L. Cox, personal communication, 
May 21, 2010) 
Many people were injured in this event. Although the structural failure was not an 
act of terrorism or a natural disaster, it was a disaster. Local resources were 
overwhelmed, and mutual aid from the surrounding area and region were required to 
assist in rescuing victims in a timely manner. 
2. Alaska Airlines Flight 261 Crash 
In the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Ventura, California, January 31, 2000—Julie 
Frey, former EMS Coordinator for Ventura County Emergency Medical Services 
Agency. 
On January 31, 2000, about 1621 Pacific standard time, Alaska Airlines, 
Inc., flight 261, a McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, crashed into the 
Pacific Ocean about 2.7 miles north of Anacapa Island, California. The 2 
pilots, 3 cabin crewmembers, and 83 passengers on board were killed, and 
the airplane was destroyed by impact forces. Flight 261 was operating as a 
scheduled international passenger flight under the provisions of 14 Code 
of Federal Regulations Part 121 from Lic Gustavo Diaz Ordaz 
International Airport, Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, to Seattle-Tacoma 
International Airport, Seattle, Washington, with an intermediate stop 
planned at San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California. 
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated 




Figure 5–2. Alaska Airline 261 flight path (From: Geradts, 2009) 
At the time of the accident, the EMS agency did not know if there were any 
survivors. Actions were taken consistent with a full mass casualty rescue operation. 
According to Frey,  
The EMS disaster coordinator was notified by Los Angeles County EMS 
at 1640 hrs. The incident was confirmed with OES [Office of Emergency 
Services], and disaster coordinators were called to the EOC [Emergency 
Operations Center] and arrived at 1815 hours. A notification was faxed to 
each hospital advising them that a plane had gone down but that survivors 
were not expected to be found. CISM [critical incident stress 
management] plans were initiated around 2100 hrs. I was asked to handle 
PIO operations for the coroner's office and to support family services, 
when needed. CISM operations were handled from the EMS office and at 
CBC base, as needed. (J. Frey, personal communication, June 3, 2010) 
3. Pentagon Aerial Terrorist Attack 
Arlington, Virginia, September 11, 2001—John White, Assistant Fire Chief, 
Arlington County Fire Department.  
A brief and descriptive account of the attack on the Pentagon is found in the 
Arlington County After Action Report, as follows: 
 
 43
At 9:38 a.m., American Airlines Flight #77 crashed into the west side of 
the Pentagon, just beyond the heliport. It was traveling at a speed of about 
400 miles per hour, accelerating with close to its full complement of fuel 
at the time of impact. The destruction caused by the attack was immediate 
and catastrophic. The 270,000 pounds of metal and jet fuel hurtling into 
the solid mass of the Pentagon is the equivalent in weight of a diesel train 
locomotive, except it is traveling at more than 400 miles per hour. More 
than 600,000 airframe bolts and rivets and 60 miles of wire were instantly 
transformed into white-hot shrapnel. The resulting impact, penetration, 
and burning fuel had catastrophic effects to the five floors and three rings 
in and around Pentagon Corridors 4 and 5. This act of evil cost the lives of 
189 persons in the Pentagon attack, 184 innocent victims, and the 5 
terrorist perpetrators of the criminal attack. (Arlington County, Virginia by 
Titan Systems Corporation, 2001, p. 9) 
 
Figure 5–3. Aftermath of Pentagon Attack (From: Brasscheck TV) 
After leaving a training class early because of phone calls from his wife alerting 
him to the World Trade Center incident, White said,  
…I walked out to my car. As soon as my radio comes on I hear a 
transmission from an engine company of ours. They had been at a training 
session and were on their way to a shopping center to do the practical part 
of the training. From there, on Interstate 395 about a mile south of the 
Pentagon, they watch flight 93 go in. And, I hear this on the radio. I was 
thinking ‘oh my gosh’. I flip on my lights pull out into traffic and I find 
myself in a caravan of police cars and other vehicles from our fire 
department heading for the Pentagon. I crest the hill looking down at the 
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Pentagon, and all I see is a huge column of smoke. I was thinking to 
myself, okay this is what you have trained 21 years for. (J. White, personal 
communication, June 17, 2010) 
“9:55 a.m. Assistant Chief John White arrives and is assigned EMS Branch 
Commander” (Arlington County, Virginia by Titan Systems Corporation, 2001, pp. 1–1, 
Appendix 1). White gave the command to get patients/victims out of the area as soon as 
possible. Regardless of the patient’s extent of injuries, ambulance crews were instructed 
to load and go, meaning transport patients away from the scene and to the hospital 
without any delay or on-scene treatment. “The burn injuries were unbelievable!” White 
said (J. White, personal communication, June 17, 2010). 
Employees at the Pentagon either self-evacuated or were assisted by other 
employees in evacuating. White recalled,  
…our people were in the building and were searching, but there were no 
patients. The only thing we found were the deceased or pieces. I don't 
know if you have seen some of the pictures of that morning, but there 
were literally hundreds of military personnel, some were toting 
backboards, some toting all sorts of other things, and they were bound and 
determined to go back into that building. I had the distinction of getting on 
a bullhorn and announcing that I was in charge of this aspect of the rescue, 
and no one was going back in, because it is not safe. I let them know that 
our people would bring victims out to a certain point then we may need 
you as bearers to move the victims to the triage and treatment area. There 
didn't seem to be any more but the deceased in the building. (J. White, 
personal communication, June 17, 2010) 
One thing particularly noteworthy was that the civilian rescue operation led by 
Arlington County Fire Department only lost one casualty taken out of the building alive. 
All of the other victims who were initially rescued alive survived the event. White 
humbly indicated, “You know, that's what we are all about in EMS—trying to give 
somebody back there life and health after their medical event or injury” (J. White, 
personal communication, June 17, 2010). 
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4. San Simeon Earthquake 
San Luis Obispo County, California, December 22, 2003—Tom Lynch, former 
Emergency Medical Services Agency Director, San Luis Obispo County; was director at 
the time of this event  
A magnitude 6.6 earthquake struck the central coastal area of California on 
Monday, December 22, 2003 at 11:15 AM. The epicenter was six miles northeast of the 
town of San Simeon and 24 miles from the city of Paso Robles (U.S. Geologic Survey). 
USGS reported,  
Two people killed and about 40 buildings collapsed or severely damaged 
at Paso Robles. At least 40 people injured in the Paso Robles-Templeton 
area. Buildings damaged and small fires occurred at Cambria and Morro 
Bay. The airport at Oceano was closed due to cracks in the runway. More 
than 10,000 homes and businesses were without power in the Paso Robles 
area. (U.S. Geologic Survey) 
The earthquake was felt has far north as Santa Rosa, south as far as Oceanside; it was felt 
in much of central California and as far east as Bullhead City, Arizona. 
San Simeon was the first incident in years that had a total countywide 
impact. What made it memorable for me is how everybody stood up for 
the occasion. Not just the in-county people, but I cannot tell you the 
number of voicemail's … from other EMS agencies were calling to offer 
help. People as far away as Los Angeles which was over 200 miles away 
felt the impact…They then offered any support that we needed. The 
Regional Disaster Medical Health (RDMH) system kicked in with an 
official notification from them asking what type of assistance we needed. 
Everybody including the [local] staff person with a broken ankle put all of 
their personal needs to the side and immediately jumped in to manage the 
incident. That to me was the most memorable. (T. Lynch, personal 
communication, Monterey County, May 27, 2010) 
5. La Conchita Landslide 
La Conchita, Ventura County, California, January 10, 2005—Barry Fisher, former 
Emergency Medical Services Administrator for Ventura County; was director at time of 
this event  
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La Conchita is a small-unincorporated community wedged between the steep 
coastal mountains and the Pacific Ocean, located just north of the City of Ventura. 
According to the town’s website,  
In 1995 the hill behind La Conchita failed and buried 9 homes but no lives 
were lost…On January 10, 2005 the hill failed again only this time it 
killed 10 residents and destroyed 18 homes. The remainder of the 
community (171 homes) is - according to Ventura County, in peril from 
any additional heavy rain. (La Conchita Community Organization) 
Barry Fisher stated that,  
Rescue operations were taking place while additional equipment and 
supplies were being moved into our county. Lots of responders and 
neighbors from La Conchita neighborhood were digging in various areas 
where they knew people were home at the time of the landslide. The 
Ventura EMS agency was involved along with ambulance providers, 
various fire department responders including mutual aid from as far away 
as the city of Los Angeles, Office of Emergency Services, Sheriff, 
California Highway Patrol, public information officer, medical examiner 
and private companies that provided tractors, back hoes, and dump trucks. 
Ten people were killed which included several small children. 
 
 
Figure 5–4. Hillside view of La Conchita mudslide (From: La Conchita Community 
Organization) 
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This was a good test of our ambulance mutual aid system with Santa 
Barbara County AMR and the Santa Barbara County EMS agency. Having 
good relationships with your neighboring counties comes in handy when 
disaster strikes. This incident verified that we have a great system in place 
and can count on our neighbors to respond quickly with no questions 
asked (B. Fisher, personal communication, May 11, 2010). 
6. Beverly Healthcare Center Evacuation 
Stockton, California, July 23, 2006—Dan Burch, Emergency Medical Services 
Administrator for San Joaquin County, and Region IV Disaster Medical Health 
Coordinator. 
Beverly Healthcare Center is a skilled nursing facility (SNF). A SNF is similar to 
a hospital in that people are admitted who need short-term or long-term care. Patients 
often are admitted following surgery or some other significant medical event that requires 
physical rehabilitation and daily oversight. SNF patients are often elderly with fragile 
medical conditions. The evacuation of the skilled nursing facility was occurring because 
of the loss of air conditioning. Stockton is a city in central California and daytime 
temperatures often exceed 100 degrees in the summer months. 
Two elderly patients were taken to an area hospital the night before the 
evacuation event. The patients seemingly suffered from heat-related illness primarily due 
to the facility’s air conditioning failure earlier that day. One patient died. Dan Burch 
indicated,  
This happened from a Friday night where a couple of patients were sent in 
to this non-base hospital with heat illness. The physician was saying there 
is something wrong at this care facility, and he called law enforcement, 
and said there is something wrong with the care being provided at facility, 
and you need to go check on it. So, law enforcement turfed it to the fire 
department and the fire department realized that the facility did not have 
air conditioning. Therefore, they made the determination that it had to be 
evacuated. (D. Burch, personal communication, May 28, 2010)  
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The EMS agency became involved on Saturday at about 5:30 in the morning. 
Serving as the EMS director and the Regional Disaster Medical-Health Specialist 
(RDMHS), Burch helped bring order into chaos by becoming involved through a 
runaway mutual aid incident. Burch said,  
When I got called, there was a request from the field for an additional 50 
ambulances. The facility had about 200 people that needed to be 
evacuated…Basically, their [Stockton Fire] mutual aid request was for one 
ambulance for every person…As I got involved with this incident and 
canceled those mutual aid resources, it turned out to be one of the most 
important things that we did. (D. Burch, personal communication, May 28, 
2010) 
All patients were evacuated in an orderly and deliberate manner to other skilled 
nursing facilities throughout the region over the period of a couple of hours. In addition, 
ambulance resources throughout the region were not drained in the process. Repairs were 
made within a few days to the facility, and patients began returning to the SNF within 
one week. Burch said, “there were no bad outcomes as a result of the evacuation even 
though many of the patients were fragile. No one was injured during the evacuation” (D. 
Burch, personal communication, May 28, 2010). 
The following year, the State of California fined Beverly Healthcare Center 
$80,000 because of poor care (California Department of Public Health, 2007).  
7. Virginia Tech Shootings 
Blacksburg, Virginia, April 16, 2007—Neal Turner, Emergency Services 
Coordinator, Montgomery County 
“On April 16, 2007, one student, senior Seung Hui Cho, murdered 32 and injured 
17 students and faculty in two related incidents on the campus of Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University (‘Virginia Tech’)” (Governor Kaine, Commonwealth of 
Virginia, 2007). Neal Turner was responding to the incident, and he recalled,  
…the day of the shooting the population [on campus] was about 34,500 
people. That equates to 26,700 students, 9,000 of which live on the 
campus dorms; 7133 employees, that is not counting student employees; 
about 1,000 visitors and contractors, and transit workers and other folks. It 
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is a huge and beautiful campus…The campus itself is comprised of over 
131 buildings; the campus is made up of about 2,600 acres (about 4 square 
miles). Now, that is just the main campus…There is probably another 
10,000 acres that Virginia Tech owns around the area. There are 16 road 
entrances to the main Virginia Tech campus…It is not a facility that can 
be easily secured. 
 
Figure 5–5. Students gather at Virginia Tech memorial service (From: Governor 
Kaine, Commonwealth of Virginia, 2007) 
Montgomery County has an all-volunteer fire and rescue configuration. There are 
five paid personnel throughout the county: a paid fire chief, a paid rescue chief in 
Christiansburg, a fire code official, a fire prevention officer in Blacksburg, and the 
emergency coordinator. This comprises all only-paid staff throughout Montgomery 
County, other than some private ambulance services. Upon understanding the scope of 
the event, “we assembled, within 20 minutes, 40 law enforcement agencies, 27 
ambulances, along with 120 volunteer rescue personnel …That to me was phenomenal” 
(N. Turner, personal communication, June 18, 2010).  
Turner recalled the following,  
I was called that morning, called by the Virginia Tech rescue squad, with 
initial reports of shots being fired in Norris Hall. It was well known that 
Norris Hall is a teaching facility on the campus; it was a classroom. There 
were laboratories on the first floor and classrooms on the second floor, so 
it was a heavily populated building…My function from the time I left the 
office to the time I got there was to put out an all call; a call to all fire 
departments and all rescuers, we needed all of the EMT personnel that we 
could assemble. If you know anything about emergency services, then you 
know I was the guy screaming in the radio saying that we need all kinds of 
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resources…If you ever, and I pray to God that you can't, imagine that you 
have just been called to a war zone in your hometown—that ain't [sic] 
supposed to happen. It is un-imaginable. When I got there, there were 
initial reports that there were nine or 10 that had been killed. Of course, 
that number continued to rise throughout the morning until we reached 30 
people…The most I have ever seen at any one event is four people. To 
imagine 30…Well, I don't want to imagine it. (N. Turner, personal 
communication, June 18, 2010) 
8. San Diego Firestorms 2007 
San Diego, California, October 2007—Marcy Metz, Chief of Emergency Medical 
Services for San Diego County 
The 2007 San Diego County Firestorms started on October 21, 2007, near 
the U.S./Mexico border at 0930 Pacific Standard Time (PST). The fires 
burned throughout San Diego County until the last fire was fully contained 
on November 9, 2007. (County of San Diego, by EG&G Technical 
Services, Inc., 2008, p. X) 
 
Figure 5–6. Firestorms of San Digeo (From: SDradio.net, 2007) 
The Harris Fire was the first of the 2007 wildfires; it burned 90,440 acres before it 
was contained. The Witch Creek Fire started just after the Harris Fire. With reported 
winds of more than 100 miles per hour (mph) in some areas, the fire jumped over 
Interstate 15. The Witch Creek Fire burned a total of 197,990 acres, making it the largest 
of the 2007 wildfires. The Rice Canyon Fire started the next day on October 22, 2007. It 
burned 9,472 acres and caused the closure of I-15 and thousands of evacuations in the 
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northern part of San Diego County. Later the same day, the Poomacha Fire started as a 
structure fire on the La Jolla Indian reservation. The fire quickly spread to Palomar 
Mountain where it joined the Witch Creek Fire and entered the Agua Tibia Wilderness. 
The Poomacha Fire burned 49,410 acres and was not fully contained until November 9, 
2007. It was the last fire of the 2007 wildfires to be contained. Other wildfires of the 
2007 San Diego County Firestorms included the Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton 
Fires (the Wilcox Fire, the Ammo Fire, and the Horno Fire), as well as the Coronado 
Hills Fire, the El Capitan Fire, and the McCoy Fire. (County of San Diego, by EG&G 
Technical Services, Inc., 2008, p. X) 
The 2007 fires resulted in 10 civilian deaths, 23 civilian injuries, and 89 
firefighter injuries. It burned a total of 368,340 acres, destroyed an 
estimated 1,600 homes; 800 outbuildings; 253 structures; 239 vehicles; 
and 2 commercial properties. More than 6,200 fire personnel fought to 
control the 2007 fires. Almost all public schools in San Diego County 
were closed, as were many businesses. Some of the major freeways were 
shut down for periods of time, and county residents were strongly 
encouraged to stay off the roads. (County of San Diego, by EG&G 
Technical Services, Inc., 2008, p. X) 
“During the entire course of the 2007 fires, 515,000 county residents received 
voluntary or mandatory evacuation notices, which exceeded the number of residents 
evacuated from New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina,” (County of San Diego, by 
EG&G Technical Services, Inc., 2008, p. X). The EMS agency operates the Medical 
Operations Center (MOC), which is the countywide coordination center for medical and 
health resources. The MOC managed the evacuation of three hospitals, which included 
one psychiatric hospital, and 12 skilled nursing facilities. In all, approximately 2,000 
patients were evacuated in one day.  
Several skilled nursing facilities were forced to evacuate because of the 
approaching fire (Wooten). Patients were placed at the county fairgrounds, which served 
as a temporary staging area until more suitable quarters could be found. It was estimated 
that the staging area would be used for four to eight hours (Bruce E. Haynes, 2007). 
Being a temporary staging area, accommodations were sparse; mattresses were placed on 
the floor. 
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Patients were eventually placed at other skilled nursing facilities and distributed 
throughout San Diego and Orange counties (M. Metz, personal communication, June 23, 
2010). In addition, “we put the hospitals on alert. We want to give them notice about 
respiratory and cardiac emergencies that may be coming from the area of the fire” (M. 
Metz, personal communication, June 23, 2010). Metz commented on the experience. She 
said,  
When the fire jumped the freeway at three locations, the winds were 
blowing at 80 or 90 mph. It was truly a firestorm of proportions we had 
never seen before. You drive through this thick smoke and ash. You have 
to put the windshield wipers on to get rid of the ash on the windshield so 
you can get around. You pull off the exit and then there would be 
roadblocks, and you can see the fire burning just a few feet away. Yet, we 
have to go into this area. You fear for family, and friends, and property. 
But, you also know that you have that responsibility to go there and work 
and help and aid in the evacuation of others. We were doing what we can 
for our county. (M. Metz, personal communication, June 23, 2010). 
9. Chatsworth Train Collision 
Chatsworth, California, September 12, 2008—Cathy Chidester, Emergency 
Medical Services Agency Director, Los Angeles County  
About 4:22 p.m., Pacific daylight time, on Friday, September 12, 2008, 
westbound Southern California Regional Rail Authority Metrolink train 
111, consisting of one locomotive and three passenger cars, collided head-
on with eastbound Union Pacific Railroad freight train LOF65–12 near 
Chatsworth, California. The Metrolink train derailed its locomotive and 
lead passenger car; the UP train derailed its 2 locomotives and 10 of its 17 
cars. The force of the collision caused the locomotive of train 111 to 
telescope into the lead passenger coach by about 52 feet. The accident 
resulted in 25 fatalities, including the engineer of train 111. Emergency 
response agencies reported transporting 102 injured passengers to local 
hospitals. (National Transportation Safety Board, 2010, p. vii) 
There were 222 passengers aboard Metrolink 111, and the trains collided 
at approximately 40 miles per hour. (Fujioka, 2009, p. 2) 
Los Angeles County has is a large population center. As such, the county has a 
significant number of EMS resources. Consequently, this incident was not considered a 
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local disaster because the resources were not actually overwhelmed. Mutual aid from 
outside the jurisdiction was not requested. Rather, this incident is categorized as large 
multi-casualty incident (MCI) (C. Chidester, personal communication, May 27, 2010).  
 
Figure 5–7. Aerial view of Metrolink collision site (From: Mata, 2008) 
Los Angeles County has a centralized EMS resource communication center, 
called the Medical Alert Center (MAC). The MAC serves as the central point of contact 
between all medical resources, hospitals, etc. and the EMS agency. During MCI events, 
the MAC directs the destination of ambulances to specific hospitals in the region (C. 
Chidester, personal communication, May 27, 2010).  
County EMS director Chidester said,  
I was in the Medical Alert Center watching patient distribution, and that's 
when I had that moment of pride. It was apparent that the patients were 
actually being distributed as we had planned. There was not any one 
hospital that was being overwhelmed and inundated, and the trauma 
patients were getting to trauma centers. When we found out that all of the 
patients except for one had survived the train accident [at that point in 
time]…I was really proud of that, and the distribution. To realize that 
patients were actually being distributed—it was gratifying. 
I went into the MAC. It was in our policy at the time that an administrator 
respond to the MAC…When I went in I saw that the dispatchers were 
doing their jobs but they did need someone from administration who had 
critical contact information for the fire chiefs…Hospital contacts were 
going on around me, and then we were getting calls from hospital 
licensing, and they wanted to get information on what was going on; 
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licensing was hearing rumors about hospital overcrowding and that Holy 
Cross could not take any more patients…So, all of a sudden licensing was 
there and the news media kept calling. We got a call from the BBC; how 
did they get our number? I had been asked to be call my boss, and the 
Board wanted a memo about what's going on, that type of thing. And then 
the state calls, and you have to deal with that. So, you really have to have 
an administrator there to be dealing with all of these other side issues, not 
necessarily with the patients. (C. Chidester, personal communication, May 
27, 2010). 
10. Highway 101/Soledad Bus Crash 
Soledad, California, April 28, 2009—Tom Lynch, former Emergency Medical 
Services Agency Director, Monterey County; was director at the time of this event 
On April 28, 2009, a large Multiple Casualty Incident (MCI) occurred on the 
Highway 101 overcrossing of Front Street in Soledad. A chartered tour bus carrying 
French citizens traveling south through Monterey County crashed. The bus hit the 
guardrail, spun around, and rolled over onto its side ejecting many people from the bus. 
Four passengers were thrown off the overpass and landed next to the railroad tracks 
below the bridge. Three people died immediately from this crash (Monterey County EMS 
Agency, 2009, p. 3). The bus carried 35 passengers plus the driver, and the majority of 
the patients did not speak English (Monterey County EMS Agency, 2009, p. 6).  
 
Figure 5–8. Scene of Hwy 101/Soledad bus crash (From: Monterey County EMS 
Agency, 2009) 
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The tour guide was identified approximately 45 minutes into the incident. 
She stated that there were 34 people in the group not including herself and 
the driver. Compounding the difficulty in determining the number of 
patients were the field workers who came to the scene from the adjacent 
field to assist. Some of these bystanders had blood on them and they were 
initially identified as patients. (Monterey County EMS Agency, 2009, p. 
8) 
“As the incident progressed, multiple aircraft congested the sky above the 
incident. The aircraft included seven air ambulances, many news helicopters, and a CHP 
airplane” (Monterey County EMS Agency, 2009, p. 6). This was a multi-discipline and 
multi-jurisdictional response. Responding agencies included: one ground ambulance 
company, three air ambulance companies, 12 fire departments, five law enforcement 
agencies, 10 hospitals, four dispatch centers, and the County EMS agency (Monterey 
County EMS Agency, 2009, p. 5). 
The incident near Salinas was kind of dynamic because we just completed 
a total revision of our MCI plan. We were in the process of implementing 
it; there had been some train-the-trainer activity. But, a number of the 
people who had worked on the plan were at the incident. Even though the 
plan was not yet fully in effect because we had not yet completed all of the 
training, the people at the incident adopted elements of that plan and 
began implementation through this incident. They helped manage this 
incident quite effectively. (T. Lynch, personal communication, Monterey 
County, May 27, 2010) 
11. Jesusita Fire 
Santa Barbara, California, May 2009—Nancy Lapolla, Emergency Medical 
Services Director and Manager of Public Health Preparedness for Santa Barbara County  
The Jesusita Fire, so named after Jesusita Creek where the fire began, threatened 
the City of Santa Barbara and several unincorporated communities. At the fire’s peak, 
500 homes were in danger, 80 homes were destroyed and 15 others were damaged. One 
commercial property and 79 outbuildings were destroyed. The fire eventually burned 




Figure 5–9. Jesusita Fire burning towards Santa Barbara (From: Bill, 2009) 
In the most demanding evening of the fire, Santa Barbara County EMS Agency 
opened an alternate care site to serve medically fragile patients. At the same time, the 
agency was coordinating the evacuation of a skilled nursing facility and coordinating all 
medical transportation needs of individuals in the evacuation area. Warnings had been 
issued that the level 2-trauma center and multiple other skilled nursing facilities were in 
the path of the fire and might need to be evacuated.  
It was important for us to communicate with law enforcement so that they 
understood moving people out of these facilities may cause them to die; 
we wanted to make sure there is no mandatory evacuation unless it was 
absolutely necessary. (N. Lapolla, personal communication, June 2, 2010) 
EMS Agency director Nancy Lapolla recalled,  
You have to understand, the Jesusita fire was threatening all of Santa 
Barbara downtown. Half of the side of State Street [the main downtown 
commercial street] was under evacuation orders; there was a fear the fire 
would spread that far. We were getting inundated with phone calls 
constantly from senior retirement…special-needs facilities. Some of these 
facilities were all the way down to the water—the warning extended that 
far. It was the whole city of Santa Barbara. That night over 40,000 people 




As a result of the evacuation order, the county emergency operations center 
(EOC) and the EMS Agency department operations center (DOC) had to be evacuated 
and relocated. Both operations were moved from downtown to the University of 
California, Santa Barbara campus north of the city. The evacuation of the downtown 
facilities did not go flawlessly. Lapolla said,  
So here I am at the Public Health Department building after midnight. No 
power—all by myself, looking for the DOC staff, and I'm the only one 
here. So, I was in this building with a flashlight trying to evacuate the 
building and it was an eerie scary feeling. They had left and nobody told 
me. They didn't wait as instructed for my car. Anyway it was kind of a 
spooky thing. 
The next day at the medically fragile shelter, we had all these Alzheimer's 
patients and we didn't know who they belonged to. We didn't know who 
they were or where they belonged. Neighbors just drop them off, and the 
patients could not really communicate with us. Eventually, the neighbors 
came back for them. But, it was unsettling not knowing anything about 
them. (N. Lapolla, personal communication, June 2, 2010) 
B. SUMMARY 
Eleven disastrous events have been profiled. Some of the events had only local 
impacts, some had regional impacts and others had nation-wide impacts. In each profile, 
the circumstances and nature of the disaster is described. Outcomes and challenges are 
identified. For that person, for that day, this was the scenario they faced. This information 
is provided to establish the context for each person’s answers and opinions to the survey 
and interview questions.  
The next chapter identifies the specific findings from the surveys and interview as 
the information pertains to the research question. The findings show some clear 
commonalities between the varied disastrous events. The findings reveal common 
functions, competencies, skills, and tools used by LEMSAs in response to disasters, and 
this information is used to construct a framework for disaster preparedness. 
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VI. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Events described in the previous chapter provide the context to understand the 
circumstances, outcomes, and challenges each person interviewed for this research faced 
during the disaster. In Chapter VI, the specific findings relevant to the research question 
are identified. 
To understand preparedness, the roles or functions that need to be performed must 
be identified. It is not possible to be prepared if the situations for which each person is 
preparing are unknown. The core EMS disaster response roles are identified. Ten specific 
functions were found to be common among many of the events researched. Performing 
the functions requires some level of knowledge or prerequisites to having the ability to do 
the job. Two overarching competencies or knowledge base are identified along with three 
specific skills. The knowledge and skills identified as being essential were commonly 
used as part of the response to most of the disaster events. Specific tangible items, 
described as tools and equipment, most useful in performing the core EMS disaster 
response roles have also been identified. 
B. CORE EMS DISASTER RESPONSE ROLES 
According to the California Emergency Medical Services Authority, as shown in 
Table 4-2, three broad categories of functions exist that EMS agencies can be expected to 
perform during a disaster, as follows. 
• Assessment of Immediate Medical and Health Needs 
• Coordination of Patient Distribution and Medical Evacuation 
• Coordination of Disaster Medical and Health Resources 
The three broad categories are important in organizing activities and workload within an 
agency from an administrative perspective (California Emergency Medical Services 
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Authority, 2003). Yet, in preparing for a disaster, it is important to look deeper. 
Understanding the importance of specific roles is necessary for adequate preparedness. 
As mentioned in Chapter IV, the survey used in this study contained two distinct 
parts. The first part consisted of a normative survey containing 27 statements that 
represent the core EMS disaster response functions (California Emergency Medical 
Services Authority, 2003). See Table 4-2 and Appendix A. Participants were instructed to 
select all of the items from the list that they performed during their event. Responses to 
these series of closed-ended questions can be used to determine if some of the core 
functions are common among the various types of events. Responses were tallied and the 
results indicated that, in fact, some of the core response functions were used more often 
than others. Table 6-1 lists each core EMS disaster response role along with the 
percentage of incidents in which each function was performed. 
It was found that establishing effective, reliable interoperable communications 
between EMS, incident command, public health, and healthcare facilities was a function 
used by every EMS agency during each disaster. This finding is significant because it 
indicates that establishing interoperable communications will likely be needed in every 
disaster event in the future. In regards to disaster preparedness, having the ability to 
perform this role is critically important to a response effort. 
The next most important core EMS functions were: 1) activating the Disaster 
Medical and Health System and notification of key positions; initiating recall to staff 
spare ambulances, and provide immediate surge capability; 2) assessing the need for 
additional medical resources (mutual aid); and 3) having the ability to acquire, allocate, 
mobilize and support additional resources (mutual aid). These three functions were 
performed in 90 percent of the disasters studied. The last two items are related to mutual 
aid. Having sufficient situational awareness to understand if mutual aid is needed appears 




Being able to develop awareness of the situation and passing that information to 
others in the command chain was performed in 80 percent of the events. Situational 
awareness is not only a frequently used core EMS function, but as discussed later, 
situational awareness is a fundamental skill that is essential to disaster response.  
The next three core functions were used in 70 percent of the responses to 
disasters. They are: 1) activating medical surge plans, procedures, and protocols; 2) 
managing pre-hospital patient distribution and tracking; and 3) tracking use and 
assignments of personnel, equipment, and other non-disposable medical resources. A 
disaster can partly be defined as an event that overwhelms the resources in the system. 
These three functions are all related to managing more patients and more resources than 
can normally occur. Tracking patient locations and the status of resources are frequently 
performed EMS roles during a disaster. 
 
Orig. 
Order Core EMS Disaster Response Role Percent 
4. Establish effective, reliable interoperable communications between EMS, incident 
command, public health, and healthcare facilities 100 
1. Activation of the Disaster Medical and Health System and notification of key 
positions; initiate recall to staff spare ambulances and provide immediate surge 
capability 
90 
17. Assess need for additional medical resources (mutual aid) 90 
18. Ability to acquire, allocate, mobilize and support additional resources (mutual aid) 90 
5. Develop situation status information and report status to appropriate 
channels/levels 80 
3. Activate medical surge plans, procedures, and protocols 70 
7. Manage pre-hospital patient distribution and patient tracking 70 
15. Track use and assignments of personnel, equipment, and other non-disposable 
medical resources 70 
2. Transformation of pre-hospital system to disaster status 60 
14. Maintain an EMS resource inventory for the system 60 
   
8. Coordinate the establishment of temporary Field Treatment Sites (FTS); designate, 
manage and support FTS 40 
12. Coordinate evacuation of casualties to outside the area if the local capacity is 
exceeded 40 
16. Provide medical support, safety considerations, and Personal Protective Equipment 
(PPE) for EMS responders and hospitals 40 
20. Manage support to hospitals; ensure adequacy of medical equipment and supplies 
in support of immediate medical response operations and for restocking 
supplies/equipment requested 
40 




Order Core EMS Disaster Response Role Percent 
9. Manage facility-to-facility transfers (interfacility transfers) 30 
19. Activate healthcare workers’ and volunteers’ call systems 30 
22. Manage support to other health facilities; coordinate with alternative emergency 
medical providers (clinics, skilled nursing facilities) 30 
10. Coordinate the evacuation from damaged or overwhelmed medical facilities 20 
11. Activate alternative care sites and overflow emergency medical care facilities to 
manage hospital surge capacity 20 
21. Coordinate acquisition of private source medical supplies 20 
25. Ensure the timely provision of medical supplies to shelters and mass care and 
medical facilities 20 
26. Provide personnel for shelters and mass care and medical facilities 20 
27. Implement austere medical care standards, as appropriate, to manage mass casualty 
events  20 
13. Coordinate receiving of casualties from other jurisdictions (providing mutual aid) 10 
23. Monitor supply usage and stockpile levels of health facilities, mass prophylaxis 
sites, and other critical care venues; process and manage requests for additional 
medical supply personnel or equipment 
10 
24. Request Strategic National Stockpile assets from Centers for Disease Control 0 
Table 6–1. Percentage of Events that Core EMS Disaster Response Role was 
Performed 
Transforming the pre-hospital system to disaster status was used in 60 percent of 
the events. This transformation is an important, deliberate decision because it 
significantly affects operations. EMS systems typically have sufficient resources to 
manage day-to-day routine emergencies. Full uses of all system resources are devoted to 
the rescue and response of one or a few incidents in any given day; extraordinary efforts 
are made to care for the individual. In a disaster, the operations of the EMS system must 
be switched to achieving the greatest good for the greatest number of people with the 
available resources; the focus is no longer on the individual. Changing to disaster mode 
only occurs when it is known that not enough resources are available to operate in the 
standard routine manner. Perhaps, the finding that EMS systems changed to disaster 
mode in 60 percent of cases studied is an indicator that the local EMS agencies did not 
consider 40 percent of the cases to be disasters. 
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Maintaining an EMS resource inventory for the system was used in 60 percent of 
the events. Knowing the number and type of resources available appears to be an 
important element in successfully responding to a disaster, and this information will help 
to build an accurate situational awareness. 
Of the 27 core EMS disaster response functions, 10 core functions were used 
more frequently than the others. These 10 were described above. The remaining 17 core 
functions were used in less than half of the events. Any one of the 27 core functions may 
be the most important role during a disaster, given the right circumstances. For example, 
it should be noted that Function No. 24—Request Strategic National Stockpile assets 
from Centers for Disease Control, was not used by any LEMSA. However, none of the 
disasters included in the study involved a biological attack or chemical emergency. 
Another example is Function No. 13—Coordinate receiving of casualties from other 
jurisdictions (providing mutual aid). No one interviewed was in the position of receiving 
casualties from a neighboring disaster. If the disasters included in the study involved a 
response from this perspective, it is posited that these functions may have scored 
significantly higher. The nature of the event will influence which of the core functions 
are likely to be used more often than the others. 
Six of the disasters included in this study involved relatively small numbers of 
victims: 50 to 222. The other five disasters impacted 1,500 or more people. In analyzing a 
smaller disaster, defined here as less than 250 victims against a larger disaster, and 
defined here as more than 1,500 people affected, a significant difference in the order of 
importance of the 27 core EMS disaster response functions does not appear to exist. The 
results do indicate, however, that more of the 27 functions are used when the event is a 
larger disaster. 
In the events included in this study, 17 of the functions were performed less 
frequently than the others. This is a significant finding. It indicates that in regards to 
general disaster preparedness of a local EMS agency, building the capabilities to perform 
the top 10 core EMS functions may place the organization in an advantageous position if 
a disaster strikes. It may be prudent to devote resources to build competency at 
performing the top 10 core EMS functions before the other seventeen. In other words, a 
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greater likelihood exists that the top 10 core EMS functions will be used in a disaster. 
Therefore, to achieve an adequate level of disaster preparedness, local EMS agencies 
should develop the competency to perform these 10 functions, at a minimum. 
C. SKILLS NEEDED TO SUCCESSFULLY RESPOND TO A DISASTER 
One segment of the research question to be explored in this thesis was to identify 
the skills a LEMSA needed to fulfill its role successfully in responding to the needs of the 
community during a disaster. Open-ended interview questions were used to elicit 
responses that might identify specific skills. All responses were analyzed as described in 
Chapter IV.  
Five specific competencies were identified as being the most important in 
successfully responding to a disaster. They are listed below in order of importance. 
Importance was determined quantitatively from the interview data. There were seven 
interview questions, and each time a specific skill was mentioned in a response to a 
question, it was tallied. For example, the highest score possible for any one particular 
skill in one interview would be seven, e.g., once per question, or 77 for all eleven 
incidents. If a skill was mentioned during the response to one interview question, it was 
tallied once, but not counted again for that question. Counting responses in this manner 
was used to maintain objectivity. If a respondent were to mention situational awareness 
eight times in response to one question, the overall mathematical results would be skewed 
too heavily on one person’s opinion. The researcher avoided skewing the results by only 
counting a skill one time per question. All skills were then tallied for all interviews, and 
the results revealed the following as the five most important skills. 
1. Experience (score of 16) 
2. Preplanning (score of 15) 
3. Relationships (score of 9) 
4. Incident Command System (ICS)/National Incident Management System 
(NIMS)/ Mutual Aid (score of 8) 
5. Situational Awareness (score of 6) 
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Five other skills were identified and mentioned in the interviews by individuals. 
Yet, only one person mentioned these five other skills. In other words, all of the other 
skills identified had a score of one (1) from the open-ended interview questions. The 
other five skills are geographic information system proficiency; ability to process and use 
medical volunteers (physicians); having technical ability to set-up interoperable 
communications equipment; having an EMS data system for real-time information flow; 
and having a hospital data system for real time information flow. The lack of repetition 
makes it difficult to conclude that these other skills can be applicable in a broader 
context. Perhaps, in a larger sample size, the results might be different. However, the 
results of this study indicate a lack of common applicability for these other five skills.  
1. Experience and Preplanning 
It was awkward to describe and categorize experience and preplanning as skills. A 
skill is “…something, especially a trade or technique, requiring special training or manual 
proficiency” (skill). Experience on the other hand is “knowledge or practical wisdom 
gained from what one has observed, encountered, or undergone” (experience). 
Preplanning is “a scheme or method of acting, doing, proceeding, making, etc., developed 
in advance” (preplanning). Perhaps experience and preplanning are better referred to as 
underlying competencies or knowledge base. Whereas, the ability to build and maintain 
relationships, use standardized command structure processes, and construct situational 
awareness can more easily be described as skills. 
The two most important underlying competencies or knowledge base needed in 
successfully responding to disasters is experience and preplanning. Experience as 
described in this context is having participated in a disaster response in the past and/or 
having participated in a sufficient number of drills and exercises where personnel have 
confidence in their abilities to perform the functions.  
Obviously, disasters are not everyday occurrences; they are rare events. LEMSA 
personnel may work an entire career and not have first-hand disaster response experience. 
Consequently, facing an actual disaster may be a daunting challenge—the fear of the 
unknown. Having experience working in disastrous circumstances allows EMS 
 66
responders to understand what is expected of them and they can build the knowledge 
based on actions and decisions that achieved the best outcomes. Having experience also 
boosts the confidence of responders. One respondent offered,  
You have to revert to your training and experience. That ongoing routine 
training got people comfortable in their roles. It comes down to having 
confidence to make the decisions. I know that I have been trained on 
technology, and I can function with that technology. This knowledge gives 
me the confidence to be able to perform well during a large-scale event 
and be effective. (T. Lynch, personal communication, Monterey County, 
May 27, 2010) 
Another respondent stated,  
First and foremost: experience. Having experience with emergency 
response for the majority of your lifetime, you go back and subconsciously 
in the archives of your mind you draw on that experience. It's just huge. 
(N. Turner, personal communication, June 18, 2010) 
The firestorm of 2007 in San Diego was not the first time the EMS agency contended 
with this type of disaster. EMS Chief Marcy Metz said the prior event in 2003 improved 
the response capabilities in 2007, “…my experience in the emergency field, having been 
through the 2003 fires, and knowing what to expect” (M. Metz, personal communication, 
June 23, 2010). Wildfires have been repeated disasters in Santa Barbara, as well. EMS 
Agency Director Nancy Lapolla informed,  
I think it was having plans in place and having practiced those plans…We 
have done this before. This is not our first fire. We have had other fires at 
a smaller scale. So we had the opportunity to exercise our plans, use our 
maps, practice how we communicate and help coordinate calls. (N. 
Lapolla, personal communication, June 2, 2010)  
One need not have first-hand disaster response experience to be adequately 
prepared for a disaster. Training, exercises, and drills can be a substitution to achieve 
adequate preparedness. Metz stated, “exercises and drills. Practice, practice, practice is 
the key to having staff that feel confident and competent when an event like this 
happens” (M. Metz, personal communication, June 23, 2010). A similar response was 
provided from Los Angeles County when questioned on ways to achieve disaster 
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response success in the future, “implement frequent ongoing training on the policies and 
procedures, and drills with the medical alert center and with field personnel” (C. 
Chidester, personal communication, May 27, 2010). An analogous response came from 
the East Coast. Arlington County Assistant Fire Chief White said,  
I think it would make the most sense to spend additional resources on 
more simulations…It would be good to have the students walk through 
what they would do. Their decision-making process gets better the more 
it's practiced, and can be practiced with simulation drills. (J. White, 
personal communication, June 17, 2010) 
Preplanning in the context of this study means having pre-prepared mass-casualty 
disaster response plans based on the likeliest threats to the jurisdiction, and continually 
updating and improving disaster response plans based on lessons learned from 
debriefings of new multi-casualty incidents. Respondents reiterated numerous times the 
importance of having a pre-prepared disaster response plan.  
If the first time you have ever thought about the emergency is during the 
emergency then the event will be a disaster... Having a plan in place was 
useful; it did not have to be created on-the-fly during the event. This was 
extremely useful. (Burch, 2010) 
Certain types of natural disasters exist in which a jurisdiction can anticipate being a 
realistic threat. For example, jurisdictions in the Southern Sierra Nevada mountain range 
of California should anticipate wildfires, floods, and earthquakes. However, the 
likelihood of a hurricane or a tsunami is practically nil.  
Virginia Tech rescue squad had previously planned and exercised a mass 
casualty drill the previous year, and they had completed their MCI plan 
and conducted training. To me, that was so invaluable. They had a sense 
of what we got to do, and this is what we got to do it with. (N. Turner, 
personal communication, June 18, 2010) 
Having pre-made disaster response plans that addressed the likely scenarios was 
identified as an important component of EMS preparedness. Louis Cox indicates,  
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One, you have to have a comprehensive plan; everybody has to know the 
plan; and everyone has to follow the plan. If you have one section that is 
not following plan they can ruin everything. (L. Cox, personal 
communication, May 21, 2010) 
Further, analyzing past response actions, applying lessons learned, and updating 
plans based on those lessons is also an important element of building the knowledge base. 
Metz advises, “even to this day when we have drills or exercises, and we identify where 
we need to improve…the lessons learned are just critical as we plan for future events,” 
(M. Metz, personal communication, June 23, 2010). An official from Los Angeles 
County states, “utilizing lessons learned from every single major incident [is standard 
practice]…We make changes to policy based on the information from major incident 
debriefings” (C. Chidester, personal communication, May 27, 2010). 
2. Relationships 
The three most important skills needed to respond successfully to disasters are 1) 
the ability to build and maintain relationships across disciplines and across jurisdictions, 
2) the ability to work within and use standardized incident command structure processes 
and manage mutual aid resources, and 3) the ability to construct accurate situational 
awareness. It is noteworthy that these three skills were so prevalent among the responses 
to the open-ended interview questions. The questions focused on identifying the reasons 
that made EMS disaster response successful. It is significant that all three of these skills 
were common among nearly all of the experienced professionals interviewed in this 
study. The specific terms used by respondents varied, but the concepts were nearly 
universal among the respondents.  
Relationships in the context of this study equates to having knowledge and 
familiarity with individuals of other disciplines and other jurisdictions and their 
operational practices. Beyond just knowledge and familiarity, trust is an important 
element of relationships. Overcoming some of the challenges in responding to a disaster 
involves knowing the roles of other responding agencies and having trust in their abilities 
to perform their duties.  
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Responders at the sky bridge collapse in Kansas City knew each other before the 
event.  
…knowing the people that were there is what made it [the response] so 
significant…the individuals in charge of the plan knew each other...We 
knew each other; we personally knew each other. It made things go better, 
everybody did their own job as good as they could. We helped each other. 
It was knowing them, trusting them, and respecting them that made a 
difference…If you come to a disaster and meet them there for the first 
time, you know there are too many unknowns. (L. Cox, personal 
communication, May 21, 2010) 
Prior to the 2007 wildfires in San Diego community partners and EMS stakeholders had 
built relationships.  
The fact that we had built such good relationships with our community 
partners and stakeholders contributed greatly to our success. The 
partnerships that were developed before the emergency, during the 
planning were critical. (M. Metz, personal communication, June 23, 2010) 
A similar story was told about the response to the terrorist attack of the Pentagon. 
Working together is the key to success…This experience in working on a 
regional basis in the past has been a valuable lesson. All of those 
relationships that we built from 1995 to 2001 showed up that day on 
September 11. We were operating on the grounds at the Pentagon with the 
very few faces that we did not know. This cooperative effort allowed us to 
have the resources in both equipment and personnel to be effective that 
particular day…Quite frankly without those collaborative relationships we 
built ahead of time there may have been additional loss of life. We would 
not have been as efficient—we would not have had the resources as quick 
as we did to apply to it. (J. White, personal communication, June 17, 
2010) 
Performing EMS disaster response duties in Santa Barbara were facilitated by previous 
relationships.  
Relationships that you have established in advance, ahead of time are 
really valuable. Even though ICS is positions and functions, not 
individuals, it is the persons in those roles that make it happen. So, in 
calling hospital administrators they expect a call from me personally, they 
know me. A lot of it is personal trust—it comes down to that. (N. Lapolla, 
personal communication, June 2, 2010) 
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One unifying theme was that success was achieved because responders, including 
mutual aid responders, personally knew each other. There was a high level of trust in 
each other’s ability to perform their duties. Trusting relationships were established in 
advance, and the familiarization, confidence, and mutual respect in competency to get the 
job done was a primary factor in successfully collaborating. As the EMS mission requires 
performance of the job through numerous agencies, trust3 appears to be an important 
element of the EMS response to a disaster. 
3. Incident Command System (ICS)/National Incident Management 
System (NIMS)/Mutual Aid 
All disasters are local, e.g., city, county, or tribal. Wherever a disaster occurs, the 
local government organizations are the first to respond and react to address the needs of 
its people. Mutual aid from surrounding areas and the state government may be requested 
or offered. Given the magnitude of the event, assistance from the federal government can 
be requested. In a catastrophic event, federal agencies are moving towards a model where 
resources are pushed to the local level without request from the incident commander (The 
White House, 2006, p. 18; U.S. Homeland Security Department, 2008).  
Ultimately, when a catastrophic incident occurs, regardless of whether the 
catastrophe has been warned or is a surprise event, the Federal government 
should not rely on the traditional layered approach and instead should 
proactively provide, or ‘push,’ its capabilities and assistance directly to 
those in need. (The White House, 2006, p. 19) 
The assistance that the federal government can bring to bear during a catastrophic event 
will likely improve the situation. In a catastrophe, local government and perhaps states 
will not have the resources needed to respond adequately. The National Response 
Framework and Emergency Support Function Annexes provide a sound plan for 
coordinating federal resources into the response effort. However, having a state and 
federal response greatly increases the complexity of the event. 
                                                 
3 Having a prior relationship based on trust and confidence in each other to perform respective duties 
appeared to be the best circumstance. However, confidence in another was not essential. Knowing the 
capabilities of another, even if those capabilities were subpar, allowed others to compensate for the known 
shortcomings. Having the prior relationship is enough; dealing with unknown capabilities is the least 
desirable circumstance. (A. Elliott, personal communication, August 2010). 
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Disastrous events are fraught with unknowns. The circumstances during a disaster 
are anticipated to be anywhere from complex, to chaotic, to utter disorder (Bellavita, 
2006, p. 4). Disorder occurs when agencies responding to a disaster are unable to put the 
event into a known context and cannot reach agreement on a course of action (Bellavita, 
2006, p. 6). Yet, myriad responding agencies must learn to adapt rapidly to the 
circumstances to face the challenges appropriately (Bellavita, 2006, p. 17). 
Terrorist attacks present unique problems and circumstances for EMS responders. 
The attack itself invokes fear yet the responders must continue to perform duties in this 
emotional state (Paton & Violanti, p. 231). Moreover, a terrorist attack may reduce or 
eliminate system resources, impede the ability to perform essential functions, and create 
an enormous surge in the number of sick or injured patients. During the TOPOFF 2 
disaster exercise in 2003, it was found that the unanticipated large call volume was the 
greatest problem for hospitals in the Illinois venue (U.S. Homeland Security Department, 
2003, p. 6). Further, the hospitals in this exercise ran short on supplies and staffing (U.S. 
Homeland Security Department, 2003, p. 7). The emerging and unpredictable nature of a 
disaster event requires a higher level of critical decision making that is more demanding 
than day-to-day response activities to routine matters (Paton & Violanti, p. 237). 
Adapting existing plans to the circumstances requires creativity, and EMS personnel will 
be working in a multi-agency/multi-jurisdiction environment, which adds to the 
complexity. 
The Incident Command System (ICS) and the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) are organizational tools used to manage the difficulty and chaos of a 
disaster and the complexity of managing mutual aid resources. Having the ability to work 
within ICS/NIMS structure and understand the terminology, philosophy, and processes is 
an essential skill.  
A standardized command structure process helps to focus response efforts on 
established unified goals, thereby reducing some of the complexity. The unified 
command structure used at the Virginia Tech shootings incident worked well.  
 
 72
The groups acted as one; they didn't look at the color of the uniform they 
looked at the objective. I think that in anything we do, especially if it is 
emergency services related, when we focus on the objective we 
accomplish the goal. When we focus on ourselves, we are going to miss 
the mark…As much as people fight the ICS training and NIMS, we had a 
command system set up that functioned well. We came together as a 
unified group. That is what brought things to an acceptable conclusion. (N. 
Turner, personal communication, June 18, 2010) 
The ICS/NIMS approach also provided a framework to manage a vast number of mutual 
aid responders to the Pentagon attack.  
The most important tools were, this may sound funny, but relationships 
and a general understanding by everybody of what the mission was. We 
were all working towards the same goal…we were all one. (J. White, 
personal communication, June 17, 2010) 
An ICS/NIMS structure was used for the Highway 101/Soledad tour bus accident, and 
experiences of the effectiveness were similar.  
It actually worked, it really did. In fact, the planning section chief in the 
incident was a retired fire chief, and we had worked quite closely; we 
worked hand in glove functionally for that incident. (T. Lynch, personal 
communication, Monterey County, May 27, 2010) 
EMS Chief Marcy Metz offered other comments on command. “Education and 
training in ICS…having the basic fundamentals and knowledge and experience of 
incident command and all that training that we complain about really did pay off” (M. 
Metz, personal communication, June 23, 2010). Ventura County Public Health Director, 
and then EMS Administrator Barry Fisher, commented on the La Conchita landslide, “a 
unified command was set up pretty quick which was the key to smooth operation of the 
incident” (B. Fisher, personal communication, May 11, 2010). In looking back on the 
Alaska Airline crash off the coast of California, Julie Frey offered comments for 
improving future response efforts, “mandatory training of ICS for all county Department 
managers” (J. Frey, personal communication, June 3, 2010). During the Jesusita Fire in 
Santa Barbara, Nancy Lapolla knew that she did not have enough staff people to provide 
all of the core EMS roles that needed to be performed. She was reliant on mutual aid 
from outside the department to help her meet the EMS Department’s obligations. Using 
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the ICS/NIMS organizational framework she was able to manage the responsibilities. “I 
knew that we did not have enough depth to cover all of the duties, so using other resource 
was just invaluable” (N. Lapolla, personal communication, June 2, 2010). 
4. Situational Awareness 
A crucial need in a complex, emerging, and chaotic situation is the ability to 
recognize signs from the chaos and build an accurate situational awareness of the event; 
doing so facilitates appropriate decision making (Paton & Violanti, p. 231). Developing 
competence at building accurate situational awareness greatly improves the ability to 
perform the essential, core EMS disaster response roles. Having keen situational 
awareness skills facilitates forecasting and anticipating needs (Paton & Violanti, p. 231).  
Situational awareness “…is knowing what is going on around you” (M. R. 
Endsley, p. 5). Having a solid grasp of the EMS needs produced by a disaster along with 
an understanding of the resources available is a practical definition of situational 
awareness. The challenge is often that little information is available to form a clear 
understanding of the situation. Alternatively, the challenge might be that there is a lot of 
information and one must select the right cues from a pile of data to form an accurate 
assessment of the situation. 
The importance of situational awareness was described by responses to the open-
ended interview questions.  
You have to be able to assess a situation quickly, make a decision quickly, 
and hopefully you've made the right decision based on the minimal 
information available to you, and within your ability to be able to process 
that information. I think that truly is a skill in itself, as well.” (T. Lynch, 
personal communication, San Luis Obispo County, May 27, 2010)  
Metz from San Diego said,  
I relied heavily on the people here at the MOC for situational awareness 
and planning…To have this detailed information readily available was 
important and useful. It helped with our situational awareness. (M. Metz, 
personal communication, June 23, 2010) 
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Dan Burch stated,  
By understanding the broader issues we brought rational decision-making 
to the event. It was important that EMS was not just a rubber stamp to the 
incident commander in the field. Our ability to critically think about this 
evolving incident improved the conditions of the evacuation. (Burch, 
2010) 
Another example of the importance of situational awareness is provided from Los 
Angeles,  
Having fire chiefs’ cell phone numbers allowed me to contact them in the 
field at the incident and get situational information…I was watching on 
television and to find out what the media was saying so that we could all 
be on the same page regarding the actual situation. (C. Chidester, personal 
communication, May 27, 2010) 
Endsley describes situation awareness in four levels: perception, comprehension, 
projection, and temporal aspect. Level 1-Perception is the ability to detect relevant 
elements or cues from a chaotic environment. Level 2-Comprehension is the ability to 
understand the meaning and interpret the elements or cues. Level 3-Projection is the 
highest ability of situational awareness; it is the ability to forecast future events or needs 
based on the current situation. Level 4-Temporal Aspect is the ability to understand the 
importance of time in the context of the situation and employing the right timing to meet 
the needs (Endsley, pp. 5–7). 
An example of the usefulness and practical application of situational awareness 
comes from Monterey County.  
I was driving back from San Jose when I got the call…In assessing the 
situation from my vantage point we had 35+ critical injuries. I knew we 
were going to be completely out of our system resources; both in terms of 
vehicles and people. But, more importantly the psychological stress these 
people were going to be under means that these crews are going to need to 
go out of service after the incident. A [ambulance] strike team would be 
needed for system coverage and to conduct secondary transfers for 
patients from the receiving hospitals to trauma centers. (T. Lynch, 
personal communication, Monterey County, May 27, 2010) 
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In this example, the EMS official was able to use the current situation information to 
anticipate the EMS system’s future needs and begin planning for those needs. 
In the context of emergency response to a disaster, situational awareness skills 
allow responders to function adequately with few cues in a stressful, complex, and 
dynamic environment. A person with high situational awareness skills “…can construct 
mental models of complex events that allows appropriate decisions to be made…” (Paton 
& Violanti, p. 237). Further, it has been demonstrated that situational awareness is the 
main precursor to decision making (Endsley, p. 8). EMS responders and other disaster 
workers must make appropriate decisions to implement a successful response and 
recovery effort. More specifically, high situational awareness “…minimizes exposure to 
risks, allows more efficient use of resources, and enables better command and control…” 
(Paton & Violanti, p. 231). 
Of course, possessing strong situational awareness skills does not ultimately 
guarantee good outcomes. The actions taken based on the situation must still be the right 
decision. A responder may have an excellent assessment of the existing situation, yet 
make a wrong strategic or tactical decision (M. R. Endsley, p. 8). However, the chances 
for successful outcomes do increase if the decisions are based on an accurate assessment 
of the situation (M. R. Endsley, p. 27). 
D. TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT 
As discussed previously, one segment of the research question explored in this 
thesis is to identify the skills a LEMSA needs to fulfill its role successfully during a 
disaster. Another segment of the research question is to determine the tools a LEMSA 
needs for disaster response. Open-ended interview questions were used to identify 
specific tools and equipment most useful for past events.  
Six specific tools and equipment were identified as being the most important in 
successfully performing core EMS disaster response roles. They are listed in order of 
importance. Importance was determined quantitatively from the interview data in the 
same manner used in tabulating skills. All tool items were then tallied for all interviews.  
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The results are expressed in percentages; that is, the percent of events in which a specific 
tool or piece of equipment was used in EMS’ disaster response role. The results revealed 
the six most important tools and equipment. 
1. Cell phone 
2. Two-way radio 
3. Computer, along with various Internet applications4 
4. Telephone5 
5. Call Lists 
6. Geographic Information System  
 
 
Figure 6–1. Specific Tools 
                                                 
4 Interview respondents did not make a distinction between a computer and the software application 
used to perform their duties. Several specific programs were mentioned, such as Internet, ReddiNet, 
WebEOC, Reverse 911, California Health Alert Network (CAHAN), and e-mail. Yet, in the context of the 
responses, the application cannot be used without a computer and associated networks and infrastructure. 
Therefore, all computer-related responses were combined into the category of “computer, along with 
various Internet applications.” 
5 Cell phones and telephones were not grouped together. Interview respondents made the distinction 
between the two modes of communication. The technologies and infrastructure between the two modes 
vary. Consequently, the researcher did not alter the wisdom of the responses by grouping cell phones and 
telephones as one tool. 
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Several other tools and equipment were identified in the interviews. However, 
only one person mentioned all of the other items. These items were pager, bullhorn, 
clipboard, television, paper maps, nurse go-kits, a Regional Disaster Medical Health 
Coordinator, and a fax machine. The lack of commonality for each of the individual items 
makes it difficult to conclude that these other items can be widely applicable in a broader 
context.  
It is interesting to note that all of the six tools and equipment identified as 
essential in performing core roles serve to facilitate communications and provide the 
means to gather situation information. Cell phones, two-way radios, and standard 
telephones provide the means to talk with others. Through such conversations, 
information can be gathered, distributed, and exchanged. The conversations can be used 
to gather cues about the situation. 
A computer, along with various software applications and Internet access, provide 
a host of other opportunities for communicating. Specific applications were mentioned 
during the interviews as being useful.  
We have a pre-hospital computer system, which is similar to ReddiNet; we 
asked all hospitals to update their information, and to find out: who could 
take how many patients, who is down, and find out what needs they may 
have. To have this detailed information readily available was important 
and useful. (M. Metz, personal communication, June 23, 2010) 
In Los Angeles, a similar software tool that provides direct communication between 
hospitals and LEMSAs was identified. “ReddiNet was the most useful; that was 
instrumental in doing this—this gives hospital information on where patients are being 
taken” (C. Chidester, personal communication, May 27, 2010). 
During the San Simeon Earthquake, one of the EMS officials happened to be in 
Denver, Colorado. Upon learning of the disaster, the official assisted in performing some 




Being able to communicate through e-mail was essential. It is an amazing 
technology that allows me, from 1,200 miles away, to be support to an 
ongoing incident. By using the telephone, laptop, and Internet based 
hospital status system I was able to assist EMS even though I was one 
third of the country away. (T. Lynch, personal communication, San Luis 
County, May 27, 2010)  
It appears that computers and associated applications, including the Internet and e-mail, 
can be important tools in gathering and sharing information. 
Call lists in the context of this study are pre-prepared lists of contact people and 
organizations that may be needed in the disaster response, along with phone numbers or 
other vital contact information. Call lists can be in a variety of forms: lists on paper, a 
computer file, memory space within a cell phone, and so on. For the evacuation of a 
skilled nursing facility, Burch indicated, “I used a phone list. The phone list was the most 
useful resource I had available to me. Having all of the phone numbers that I needed 
readily available improved my efficiency” (Burch, 2010). San Diego uses the call list 
approach, but it is in the form of robust technology for reaching a great number of people. 
“We implemented our reverse 911, and ‘Alert San Diego’ which is our automated 
telephone delivery system” (M. Metz, personal communication, June 23, 2010). In 
addition, Metz also maintained a list for hospital contacts, “we have the hospital 
emergency planners on one distribution list” (M. Metz, personal communication, June 23, 
2010). 
Geographic information systems (GIS) are not widely used among the people 
interviewed for this study. However, the two jurisdictions that did use GIS found the 
technology to be useful. GIS assisted in providing information to build and enhance 
situational awareness. Lapolla from Santa Barbara said,  
The list of and numbers of organizations that coincide with the maps were 
available on GIS, so you can go and look electronically or on paper. The 
maps were critical—if the fire is coming we knew what we had to do. So 
we knew roughly how many ambulances and how many buses it would 
take to evacuate each facility in each zone. Since we had done our 
homework previous to the event all we needed to do was click on them 
and all of the information was there. And, it worked as we expected. (N. 
Lapolla, personal communication, June 2, 2010) 
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Metz in San Diego had a similar experience.  
One of the biggest things that aided us in performing our job was the GIS 
system; we were following the location of the fire and tracking its 
advance. From this information the MOC could predict who was at risk 
and alert those facilities to be prepared to evacuate. (M. Metz, personal 
communication, June 23, 2010) 
It is posited that GIS technology may be an important tool in the future for EMS disaster 
response and may likely be available more broadly. 
E. DIVINE INTERVENTION 
Two unexplainable occurrences were uncovered while conducting this research 
that are worth noting. Perhaps, the events might be aptly termed strokes of good luck. 
Maybe, the positive outcomes were the result of a mash-up of complex adaptive systems. 
A mash-up is the combining of two or more unrelated things that yields an unexplained 
power or energy (Ramo, 2009, pp. 126–129). For lack of a better phrase about these two 
unexplainable events, they are called divine intervention in this research. 
While in his vehicle responding to the active shootings at the Virginia Tech 
campus, the EMS official started to identify in his mind the people and resources he 
might need as this disaster unfolds. He said,  
The names of folks that I have been associated with over my 33 years in 
this business flashed in my mind that morning; not only the 30+ names, 
but I could recall their telephone numbers! That does not normally happen. 
I believe that God gives us an extra sense when we need it; I needed it and 
I got it. (N. Turner, personal communication, June 18, 2010) 
Twenty-six years earlier, in Kansas City, Missouri, a series of pedestrian bridges 
collapsed injuring hundreds. The disaster required the use of every ambulance in the city 
and within the surrounding region.  
Every ambulance in the region was deployed to the event. It was kind of 
amazing that from the time of the collapse until after midnight there was 




miracle. There was not one request for an ambulance in the entire city of 
Kansas City. I don’t know how to explain it. I can’t tell you why; that is 
just the way it was. (L. Cox, personal communication, May 21, 2010) 
Instant recall of names and phone numbers of several people; no emergency calls 
during an entire evening in a large city; these two events cannot be easily explained. Nor 
are these events likely to be replicable or predictable for future EMS disaster response 
efforts. Yet, the nature of these occurrences is curious. The positive outcomes are 
undeniable, and the events are worthy of mentioning in this research. If the cause of these 
events can be understood and captured, the ability to prepare for and respond to disasters 
may be improved. 
F. SUMMARY 
The findings from this research are significant. Existing literature does not 
identify the most important disaster response roles for EMS, nor does existing literature 
name the competencies, skills, and tools needed for achieving minimum levels of disaster 
preparedness. This research makes a strong effort to define these components. Ten 
common core EMS disaster response roles have been identified among a variety of 
disaster types from different parts of the nation. The underlying competencies or 
knowledge base it takes to execute the disaster roles successfully have been uncovered 
along with three essential skills. In addition, the tangible tools and equipment found most 
useful to perform the disaster response roles have been recognized and listed. With this 
knowledge, it may be possible to construct a realistic framework for achieving disaster 
preparedness within a local EMS agency. The framework for LEMSA disaster 
preparedness is described below. 
Ten core EMS disaster response roles have the greatest likelihood of being used 
in a disaster. To achieve an adequate level of disaster preparedness, local EMS agencies 




1. Establishing effective, reliable interoperable communications between 
EMS, incident command, public health, and healthcare facilities 
2. Activating the disaster medical and health system and notification of key 
positions; initiating recall to staff spare ambulances, and provide 
immediate surge capability 
3. Assessing the need for additional medical resources (mutual aid) 
4. Possessing the ability to acquire, allocate, mobilize, and support additional 
resources (mutual aid) 
5. Being able to develop awareness of the situation and passing that 
information to others in the command chain  
6. Activating medical surge plans, procedures, and protocols 
7. Managing pre-hospital patient distribution and tracking 
8. Tracking use and assignments of personnel, equipment, and other non-
disposable medical resources  
9. Transforming the pre-hospital system to disaster status  
10. Maintaining an EMS resource inventory for the system  
Local EMS agencies should possess two essential underlying competencies or 
knowledge bases to achieve an adequate level of disaster preparedness. 
• Experience—gain experience through participation in actual disaster 
response situations and/or gain experience by participating in a sufficient 
number of drills and exercises to have confidence in the ability to perform 
the 10 core EMS disaster response roles. 
• Preplanning–prepare mass-casualty disaster response plans based on the 
likeliest threats to the jurisdiction; continually update and improve disaster 
response plans based on lessons learned from debriefings of new multi-
casualty incidents or drills. 
Local EMS agencies must acquire and develop three specific skills to achieve an 
adequate level of disaster preparedness. 
1. Ability to build and maintain relationships across disciplines and across 
jurisdictions 
2. Ability to work within and use standardized incident command structure 
processes and manage mutual aid resources 
3. Ability to construct accurate situational awareness 
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Local EMS agencies should have available and ready six specific tools or pieces 
of equipment to achieve an adequate level of disaster preparedness.  
1. Cell phone 
2. Two-Way radio 
3. Computer, along with various Internet applications 
4. Telephone 
5. Call Lists 
6. Geographic Information System  
This framework might be a basis in which to define and envision the parameters 
by which a local EMS agency can achieve an adequate level of disaster preparedness. In 
other words, this framework may be what EMS disaster preparedness looks like. Of 
course, this framework is only a starting point, a minimum level of adequacy. Building 
competencies and skills beyond those identified in this framework, and acquiring a 
broader range of tools and equipment are likely to expand a LEMSA’s level of disaster 
preparedness. 
If this framework does accurately represent an adequate level of disaster 
preparedness, then how can the competencies and skills be measured? How do agency 
staffers, agency managers, EMS system stakeholders, elected officials, and members of 
the community know if an adequate level of disaster preparedness has been achieved? 




The findings reached in Chapter VI illustrate what disaster preparedness means 
for a local EMS agency. Uncovering this information is important and useful, but this is 
not the final step. Discussion is needed on how a LEMSA might achieve an adequate 
level of disaster preparedness.  
Using the findings from the previous chapter, it is possible to construct a basic 
framework for LEMSA disaster preparedness. Table 7-1 shows the framework. Elements 
of the framework include ten core EMS disaster response roles; two essential 
competencies or knowledge bases; three skills needed to perform the core roles; and six 
tools or equipment most useful in performing core roles. Together, the components of the 
framework embody or define minimum standards for adequate disaster preparedness. 
Although there is value in understanding the ten core EMS disaster response 
roles, knowing how to perform those roles successfully is also valuable. Items to consider 
when assessing performance capabilities are offered for each role. Performing the roles is 
contingent upon having the experience, knowledge, and skills to do so. Training 
strategies for building competencies, knowledge, and skills follows. 
 
Ten Core EMS Disaster Response Roles 
1. Establishing effective, reliable interoperable communications between EMS, incident command, 
public health, and healthcare facilities 
2. Activating the disaster medical and health system and notification of key positions; initiating recall 
to staff spare ambulances, and provide immediate surge capability 
3. Assessing the need for additional medical resources (mutual aid) 
4. The ability to acquire, allocate, mobilize, and support additional resources (mutual aid) 
5. Being able to develop awareness of the situation and passing that information to others in the 
command chain  
6. Activating medical surge plans, procedures, and protocols 
7. Managing pre-hospital patient distribution and tracking 
8. Tracking use and assignments of personnel, equipment, and other non-disposable medical 
resources  
9. Transforming the pre-hospital system to disaster status  
10. Maintaining an EMS resource inventory for the system  
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Ten Core EMS Disaster Response Roles 
Two Essential Competencies or Knowledge Bases  
• Experience –actual disaster response and/or drills and exercises  
• Preplanning –mass-casualty disaster response plans of likeliest threats; applying lessons learned 
to plans on ongoing basis 
Three Skills Needed to Perform Core Roles 
• Ability to build and maintain relationships across disciplines and across jurisdictions 
• Ability to work within and use standardized incident command structure processes and manage 
mutual aid resources 
• Ability to construct accurate situational awareness 
Six Tools or Equipment Most Useful in Performing Core Roles 
1. Cell phone 
2.  Two-way radio 
3. Computer, along with various Internet applications 
4. Telephone 
5. Call Lists 
6. Geographic Information System 
Table 7–1. Framework for LEMSA Disaster Preparedness  
B. TRAINING STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING ESSENTIAL 
COMPETENCIES, KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS 
The framework for LEMSA disaster preparedness identifies five key components, 
termed competencies, knowledge and skills essential for achieving an adequate level of 
disaster preparedness. 
• Two essential underlying competencies or knowledge bases 
• Experience –actual disaster response and/or drills and exercises  
• Preplanning –mass-casualty disaster response plans of likeliest 
threats; applying lessons learned to plans on ongoing basis 
• Three specific skills needed to perform core roles 
• Ability to build and maintain relationships across disciplines and 
across jurisdictions 
• Ability to work within and use standardized incident command 
structure processes and manage mutual aid resources 
• Ability to construct accurate situational awareness 
This section discusses strategies for developing skills and improving 
competencies. Some skill development may occur through training, which may be used to 
develop competency in ICS/NIMS, managing mutual aid resources, and enhancing 
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situational awareness capabilities. Training may provide opportunities for building 
disaster response experience, and the training setting may provide opportunities for 
building relationships. Training may also provide opportunities for improving existing 
plans, if lessons from the trainings are documented and used to update plans continually. 
Methods and strategies for building essential competencies/knowledge and developing 
skills must be understood before the five key components can be measured. Gaining 
understanding in how skills and competencies are fostered provides a basis for measuring 
those skills and competencies. 
Traditional approaches to disaster preparedness training are often geared towards 
those job classifications that generally respond to the front line, such as paramedics, 
emergency medical technicians, and fire fighters. Training and familiarization with the 
Incident Command System (ICS) and National Incident Management System (NIMS) is 
essential. Federal homeland security funding includes a mandate that states and local 
governments become proficient at ICS and NIMS, making such training prevalent in 
many venues. A multi-agency or multi-jurisdictional drill may occur once every three to 
five years, if grant monies become available for a large functional exercise. However, 
generally drills consist of one or two similar agencies, such as two fire stations in one fire 
department, or two sections within one hospital. Drills and exercises often come with an 
expectation that all participants will achieve proficiency at the end of the session. This 
leaves the responder (student) with an understanding that if the skill can be performed 
proficiently, then outcomes will be positive. Establishing unrealistic outcome 
expectations can have negative psychological impacts on emergency responders (Paton, 
1994). Traditional approaches to disaster preparedness training often focus on learning or 
improving a skill or two. Examples include conducting a bed capacity census with several 
hospitals in a region, speaking on a two-way radio, or performing triage on mock 
patients.  
Improving preparedness involves changing the focus of training. It is not 
proposed that all past training techniques be abandoned. Rather, certain components of 
training must be altered and a few new elements added to obtain a better level of 
preparedness.  
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The Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-Create Grid (Kim & Mauborgne, p. 35) shown in 
Table 7-2 provides a brief glimpse of the proposed training strategy to improve disaster 
preparedness. Some aspects or approaches of traditional training programs need to be 
reduced or eliminated all together, while other approaches need to be raised or created. 
The proposal shown in Table 7-2 is further expanded using the strategy canvas.  
 
Eliminate: Drills & exercises 
with predictable & perfect 
outcomes; Exclusion of non-
traditional responders from 
drills/exercises 
Raise: Awareness of realistic 
outcomes; Awareness of 
psychological impacts/reactions; 
Number of experiential training 
opportunities; Number of multi-
disciplinary drills 
Reduce: Single-agency disaster 
drills and exercises; Training 
that focuses solely on ICS/NIMS 
Create: Collaborative projects; 
Multi-jurisdictional disaster drills; 
Family support infrastructure; 
Frequent situations that force staff 
to deal with the unexpected 
Table 7–2. EMS Disaster Preparedness Training (Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-Create 
Grid (From: Kim & Mauborgne, 2005) 
The strategy canvas shown in Figure 7-1 illustrates the changes being proposed 
compared to traditional training approaches (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p. 25). The 
Existing Strategies line depicts the traditional training strategies for preparedness. 
Training is conducted primarily for first-responder personnel; disaster training of support 
personnel is not traditionally emphasized. Consequently, the category labeled Exclusion 
of Non-traditional Responders from Drills/Exercises is rated high for the traditional 
approach because clerical and office staff members are often excluded from such events. 
The New Strategies line is rated low for Exclusion of Non-traditional Responders from 
Drills/Exercises to depict just the opposite of the traditional approach: inclusion of non-




Figure 7–1. Training Strategies for Building Competencies, Knowledge and Skills 
Eight training strategies are listed in the strategy canvas along the horizontal axis. 
The concept behind each of these training strategies is explained below. Achieving an 
improved level of disaster preparedness in EMS involves strategically changing training 
approaches. Incorporating these strategies into a LEMSA’s training program will help to 
build the competencies, knowledge, and skills needed to respond to disasters. 
1. Expose All Levels of Staff and Volunteers to Experiential Training 
Non-traditional responders should be included in disaster exercises and drills. It is 
appropriate to include paramedics, nurses, and other clinical people in disaster drills, but 
there are myriad others that provide support and vital functions beyond those with a 
medical training. Other job classifications include administrative assistants, account 
clerks, technical support, and other office service positions. Each of these people can 
perform critical jobs during a disaster, but they need to be part of and receive the training 
that other responders receive.  
Organizations that distribute power and decision-making authority throughout and 
to the lowest levels of the structure are often the most effective. As Joshua Cooper Ramo 
states, “when you spread power instead of hoarding it, you discover benefits that you 
couldn’t have imagined in advance—and that sometimes run contrary to what you might 
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have expected” (Ramo, p. 236). In addition to improving efficiencies and possibly 
creating synergy, empowering, devolving, and delegating responsibility for decision 
making through an organization can have positive stress outcomes; more self-control can 
reduce incidences of post-traumatic stress disorder (Paton & Violanti, p. 229). 
Consequently, experiential training to boost situational awareness competencies should 
not be limited to top ranking people within an EMS organization. 
2. Leverage ICS/NIMS Training Opportunities to Build Relationships 
ICS and NIMS training is pervasive because of the federal mandate tied to grant 
funding. It is important to provide this training to satisfy the mandate and contractual 
obligations. However, beyond the mandate, as determined through this research, ICS and 
NIMS training is a key element in being successful in responding to disasters. Much of 
the basic ICS/NIMS training can be done individually online. The online courses provide 
a conceptual overview and generic concepts of operation. However, the more advanced 
courses, such as ICS 300 and ICS 400, or equivalent, require training in a classroom 
setting and require working in groups to solve problems. The advanced courses require 
application of the ICS/NIMS concepts and provide the opportunity to practice working in 
the structure and using the processes. 
Disaster preparedness training should not stop with ICS/NIMS; often it does. 
Agencies spend a great deal of effort acquiring proficiency at various ICS levels, which 
can be positive. However, using these training opportunities as venues to interact with 
other emergency response disciplines and other jurisdictions can enhance the long-term 
benefit of the training. Where possible, ICS/NIMS training sessions should be offered to 
organizations likely to be co-first responders to a local disaster and to those organizations 
in the region likely to provide mutual aid. 
3. Provide Trust-Building Opportunities at Multi-Disciplinary and 
Multi-Jurisdiction Levels 
Research conducted by Daniel J. McAllister of Georgetown University indicates a 
link exists between trust and interpersonal behavior (McAllister, 1995, p. 51). In simple 
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terms, he found that people who have experience working together, and have 
demonstrated through actions that they are competent and keep their word, build trust. 
Further, affect-based trust between individuals can improve work performance 
(McAllister, 1995, p. 53). There may be tangible disaster response performance benefits 
if individuals from different organizations have the opportunity to work, drill, and 
exercise together. Moreover, the more individuals in an organization are trusted, the more 
likely the organization to which those individuals belong is trusted (Zaheer, McEvily, & 
Perrone, 1998, p. 153). According to Zaheer et al., there is “… a direct link between 
inter-organizational trust and performance” (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998, p. 154). 
It can be concluded that agencies likely to respond together in a disaster setting can build 
trust and improve performance by routinely holding joint drills and exercises. 
4. Build Familiarization of Individual Responders Through 
Collaborative Projects 
Working together on drills and exercises is not the only venue that might build 
trust. Working together on other community projects, i.e., fundraisers, social committee, 
special projects, and professional organizations provide the opportunity to build 
interpersonal relationships. The effort that individuals make to work on and assist others 
on a common project provides a level of social support, which translates into trust; 
making the effort to help is nearly as valuable as the help itself (McAllister, 1995, p. 53), 
in regards to building trust between individuals. Moreover, informal relationships are 
vital to the work performed by organizations (McAllister, 1995, p. 55). 
Research conducted by Harvard and MIT suggests that repeated contact in a 
social setting increases trust among individuals (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & 
Soutter, 2000, p. 814). Again, this points to the opportunity for building trust among 
individuals by conducting multi-agency and multi-disciplinary, and multi-jurisdictional 
drills and exercises. Having social connections, such as in exercise planning meetings and 
steering committees, is a strong predictor of trustworthiness (Glaeser, Laibson, 
Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000, p. 840).  
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5. Ensure Training Opportunities Include Rare and Unexpected 
Elements to Build Schemata and Enhance Resilience 
Several possible negative psychological impacts exist that may affect an EMS 
responder from functioning at peak performance during a disaster. However, humans are 
resilient creatures, and not all emergency responders are equally affected or affected in 
the same manner. Good can and does come from surviving a disaster. As described by 
Richard Gist,  
Resilience is a complex set of interactions that allows people not to avoid 
the discomforts of adversity and challenge but to manage their ways 
through them, often to discover enhanced strength as a consequence. (Gist, 
p. 429) 
The negative impacts might be mitigated and the opportunity for resilience enhanced if 
organizations worked towards improving training and exercises that better prepare 
emergency responders for the complexity, ugliness, and reality of the aftermath of a 
disaster (Paton, p. 283). 
Resilience might also be fostered by expecting the unexpected. One of the disaster 
preparation strategies proposed by Brandon & Silke calls for incorporating the 
unexpected into normal situations as much as possible. They contend that by learning to 
work with the unexpected, people will react less vigorously to a one-time terrorist attack 
(Brandon & Silke, p. 187). 
Resilience following a disaster can be manifested in improved relationships. 
Survivors can become closer and more appreciative of their family and friends 
(Committee on Responding to the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism, p. 131). 
People turn to one another during and after disasters for social support. Beyond the initial 
need to reach out to family and friends to determine their status, people seek familiar  
 
groups for reassurance and support. Recognizing that people are resilient provides the 
opportunity to build on that strength and may serve to improve the recovery effort 
(Brandon & Silke, p. 187). 
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6. Develop Experiential Training Opportunities to Enhance Situational 
Awareness Skills 
People reconcile their experiences to construct integrated conceptual 
frameworks (schemata) to provide a basis for making sense of new 
experiences, anticipating future demands, and planning appropriate 
courses of action to deal with them. (Paton, p. 276) 
In other words, past experiences are used as a basis for decision making and 
taking future actions. As Paton (p. 276) further describes, people understand and react to 
an event based on what is known from their own lives. When a person is faced with a 
traumatic or stressful event, the individual’s training and experience is relied  upon to 
make good decisions and take appropriate actions. The schema provides a viable 
framework for an EMS responder to make sense of the event and develop appropriate 
action plans (Paton, p. 276). 
If the schema theory is true, then education for EMS responders can be designed 
to provide appropriate experiential training. Training designed to prepare individuals for 
the atypical demands they are likely to encounter can provide them with the knowledge, 
skills, roles, and attitudes appropriate for dealing with unknown situations (Paton, p. 
276). Having a dialogue on unexpected scenarios may help build a more familiar context 
for EMS responders, which may lessen anxiety and increase response capacity (Brandon 
& Silke, p. 187). Organizations that facilitate the capacity to place an event into a known 
context and give it meaning, such as in an experiential training program that may help 
EMS responders to understand a disastrous event and reduce the chance that responders 
will be overwhelmed (Paton & Violanti, p. 232).  
7. Establish Realistic Expectations of Success 
The point of adjusting EMS education programs to include atypical and 
unexpected scenarios is to increase adaptive capacity. The broader the range of 
experience, the more familiar people become at recognizing cues that help build an 
accurate situation assessment. Moreover, such training may improve an EMS responder’s 
ability to adapt to the complex and unusual circumstances faced. Training that 
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incorporates 1) realistic outcome expectations, not sugarcoated perfect outcomes (Paton, 
p. 283), 2) an ability to differentiate personal and situational constraints, and 3) 
interpretive processes that review experiences as learning opportunities that enhance 
future competence provides the opportunity to increase adaptive capacity and ultimately 
improve performance (Paton & Violanti, p. 235).  
8. Introduce Psychological Impacts of a Terrorist Attack and How 
Perceptions May be Altered 
Situational awareness is one of the key skills for achieving preparedness. The 
impacts of a terrorist attack and perhaps other disasters may skew perceptions and distort 
the actual situation in the EMS responder’s mind. It is important to recognize this 
phenomenon and ensure responders are aware of the implications. Understanding how the 
mind might respond to an overwhelming and frightening event may improve the ability to 
build accurate situation awareness. 
The intent of terror is to instill fear and inflict psychological pain on a society 
(Committee on Responding to the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism, p. 99). Acts 
of terrorism serve to disrupt the sense of safety in a community and fear destabilizes 
confidence in the surroundings (Paton & Violanti, p. 228). Fear not only strikes the 
public at large, but those people expected to perform EMS roles may also be fearful. Yet, 
Zimbardo states, “…the human mind is so marvelous that it can adapt to virtually any 
known environmental circumstance in order to survive, to create, and to destroy, as 
necessary” (Zimbardo, p. 26). Providing information about normal psychological 
reactions and normal fear resulting from a terrorist attack provides an appropriate 
contextual framework for EMS responders and other homeland security personnel to help 
understand the emerging situation (Committee on Responding to the Psychological 
Consequences of Terrorism, p. 109). It is this adaptable human mind and spirit coupled 
with essential preparedness skills that may improve the local EMS agency’s ability to 
respond during a disaster. 
Stressful events, such as a terrorist attack, can create long-term psychological 
impacts if the event “shatters a person’s view of the world” (Brandon & Silke, p. 182). 
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Without experience or training that provides a substitute for experience, it can be difficult 
for emergency responders to make sense of the events. Without a context to understand 
the event, stress is increased and coping mechanisms may not be adequate. Fear and 
stress may deplete an EMS responder’s physical ability to perform the job adequately 
(Brandon & Silke, p. 177). Beyond physical depletion, stress may affect cognitive and 
creative abilities; performance in creating solutions to complex, emergent problems may 
be adversely affected (Paton & Violanti, p. 225). 
Decisions made by emergency responders during a response to a catastrophic 
event may be based on an inaccurate situational awareness. People strive to alter the 
meanings of the attack to reduce the negative impacts. This altered view occurs without 
an understanding that the person’s view is not reflective of the actual situation (Brandon 
& Silke, p. 186). The tendency for people to be more optimistic than may be warranted 
given the actual situation can affect their decision-making ability. The skill of 
interpreting pieces of information, determining the most relevant pieces, and putting it all 
together to create accurate situation awareness can be hampered if emergency responders 
are not aware of the psychological impacts of a terrorist attack. 
Implementation of the eight training strategies listed above may ultimately 
improve disaster response capabilities. Some of the literature on disaster preparedness 
theorizes that procedures used during a disaster response should be incorporated into 
daily, routine activities. Falkenrath refers to the concept as dual-use activities 
(Falkenrath, 2000, p. 25). Nelson et al. terms the concept crosscutting capabilities 
(Nelson, Lurie, & Wasserman, Assessing Public Health Emergency Prepardness, 2007, p. 
13). Both concepts are essentially the same. They conclude that the only practical method 
of remaining prepared for disasters is to integrate disaster functions into daily duties 
(Nelson, Lurie, Wasserman, Zakowski, & Leuschner, 2008, p. 9).  
Given the metamorphosis that EMS systems must undergo to address disasters, it 
may not be practical to incorporate disaster response functions into daily routines. The 
concepts of operation are opposites. However, it may be more feasible to incorporate the 
eight training strategies into daily routines. Doing so develops skills important for 
disaster responses, and the procedures do not conflict with daily procedures. 
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C. MEASURING PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY OF THE TEN CORE EMS 
DISASTER RESPONSE ROLES 
Using the framework shown in Table 7-1 as a basis to define the parameters by 
which a local EMS agency can achieve an adequate level of disaster preparedness, the 
next step is to address methods for measuring the parameters. The 10 core EMS disaster 
response roles represent actions expected to be taken in response to a disaster.  
Some of the literature indicates that the absence of clear metrics to evaluate 
preparedness is problematic (Nelson, Lurie, & Wasserman, 2007, p. 10). Davis et al. 
indicates that disaster preparedness cannot be measured without first standardizing 
measurements of organizations and communities (Davis, Mariano, Pace, Cotton, & 
Steinberg, 2006, p. 68). A study from the University of Louisville determined that no 
single theory or set of theories exists for core concepts in disaster preparedness planning 
or practice (Covington & Simpson, 2006, p. 3). 
The findings from Chapter VI may be a step towards solving some of the past 
problems. This research indicates that the 10 core EMS disaster response roles are 
common among many local EMS agencies. Perhaps this represents a single theory for 
core concepts in disaster preparedness planning. If so, developing a standardized 
measurement to evaluate preparedness may be possible. 
It is suggested that each role be evaluated to determine if the capability exists in 
the jurisdiction by using the 10 core EMS disaster response roles as a basis for simple 
measurements. It will be incumbent upon each local EMS agency to determine if the 
jurisdiction does have the capability to perform each role, or not. Each agency must 
assess its capabilities and make a subjective judgment. Possible metrics are as follows. 
 
1. Can the LEMSA establish effective, reliable interoperable 
communications between EMS, incident command, public health, and 
healthcare facilities? Yes or No. 
2. Can the LEMSA activate the disaster medical and health system and 
notification of key positions; initiating recall to staff spare ambulances, 
and provide immediate surge capability? Yes or No. 
3. Can the LEMSA assess the need for additional medical resources (mutual 
aid)? Yes or No. 
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4. Does the LEMSA have the ability to acquire, allocate, mobilize, and 
support additional resources (mutual aid)? Yes or No. 
5. Does the LEMSA possess the skills to develop awareness of the situation 
and pass that information to others in the command chain? Yes or No. 
6. Does the LEMSA have procedures and protocols in place for activating 
medical surge plans? Yes or No. 
7. Can the LEMSA manage pre-hospital patient distribution and tracking? 
Yes or No. 
8. Can the LEMSA track use and assignments of personnel, equipment, and 
other non-disposable medical resources? Yes or No. 
9. Can the LEMSA transform the pre-hospital system to disaster status? Yes 
or No. 
10. Does the LEMSA maintain an EMS resource inventory for the system? 
Yes or No. 
The method or procedures for building the capabilities to perform each of these 
10 roles may not be common. The procedures for taking the actions vary by jurisdiction 
and are dependent upon local needs and resources. However, for purposes of developing 
standardized measurements, it is only important to determine if the role can be 
performed. The method by which each jurisdiction achieves the capability is not 
necessarily relevant. Appendix C offers suggestions on factors that might be considered 
in evaluating a LEMSA’s ability to perform each role. Items for consideration are not 
exhaustive, and many may not be applicable to every jurisdiction. Rather, these are 
provided from the author’s limited and narrow perspective; these have not been vetted in 
any way or validated through research. 
Additionally, in regards to evaluating the capability to perform each role, it is 
necessary to make a subjective judgment. Relying on the subjective opinions of 
managers, chiefs, and other high-ranking officials can be considered a weakness in the 
validity of the assessment results. It is unfortunate that reliance on subjective opinions is 
needed to measure preparedness. Yet, some believe that opinions from experienced 




& Simpson, 2006, p. 26). Self-reported data is not uncommon; it may be necessary to not 
only rely upon the opinions of experts, but also accept a certain amount of bias in the 
study of preparedness (Jackson, 2008, p. 22). 
The literature indicates that it is impossible to have 100 percent accuracy with a 
disaster preparedness measurement model. However, the biggest problem is the failure to 
reach consensus on which metrics to use, not accuracy (Covington & Simpson, 2006, p. 
27). Perhaps, using the 10 core EMS disaster response roles as metrics may move the 
EMS discipline closer to consensus and closer to a viable disaster preparedness 
measurement model. 
D. MEASURING COMPETENCIES AND SKILLS 
Several training strategies have been offered that support development of the five 
essential competencies, knowledge, and skills. However, how are these competencies, 
knowledge, and skills measured? It is not uncommon in an academic or professional 
training setting to measure competencies, knowledge, and skills with tests. Students are 
given examinations of their knowledge and graded accordingly. However, testing for 
adequate levels of experience, adequate amounts of relationships, and an adequate degree 
of situational awareness capability is problematic.  
It is not known how much experience is enough to be deemed minimally prepared 
for disasters; how much situational awareness is enough is also unknown; equally 
unknown is how many relationships are enough. If such could be known, it is likely that 
the definition of enough would vary greatly by jurisdiction. Yet, training strategies have 
been identified that develop experience, foster relationships, and improve situational 
awareness capabilities. 
If measuring experience, relationships, and situational awareness capabilities in 
EMS disaster preparedness is not practical, measuring activities likely to result in the 
development of these competencies, knowledge, and skills may be feasible. Measuring 
the supporting activities may be the most sensible approach to determining preparedness. 
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Woodbury presented evidence that measuring preparedness is possible and 
practical (Woodbury, 2005). He demonstrates through examples the ability to measure 
preparedness through modeling, breaking complex parts into components, and he shows 
examples of using outputs to measure outcomes. He states at the conclusion of his article 
that,  
…if we do nothing else, we need to put the argument of unmeasurable 
[sic] prevention behind us and accept that it can be quantified, at least by 
proxy and/or by evaluating the parts of the whole. (Woodbury, 2005) 
It appears that if terrorism prevention can be measured on a national level that it can be 
equally as possible to measure components disaster preparedness of an EMS agency at a 
local level. Measuring supporting activities by proxy to evaluate levels of experience, 
relationships, and situational awareness capabilities is practical. 
Training strategies or activities identified earlier that develop experience, foster 
relationships, and improve situational awareness capabilities may result in improved 
disaster preparedness should be further examined. The strategies offered in this research 
do not represent an exhaustive list of all possible methods for building the skills. It is 
plausible that other activities may be equally if not more effective in skill development. 
The approach used above for measuring performance capability of the 10 core 
EMS disaster response roles is replicated here for measuring competencies and skills. 
The metrics are simply the activities identified earlier posed in the form of a closed-ended 
question. Two additional activities are listed to address preplanning and standardized 
incident command structure topics. 
• Are all levels of LEMSA staff and volunteers exposed to experiential 
training sessions? Yes or No 
• Does the LEMSA leverage ICS/NIMS training opportunities to build 
relationships? Yes or No 
• Does the LEMSA provide trust-building opportunities at multi-
disciplinary and multi-jurisdiction levels? Yes or No 
• Does the LEMSA provide opportunities to build familiarization of 
individual responders through collaborative projects? Yes or No 
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• Do all training opportunities include rare and unexpected elements to build 
schemata and enhance resilience? Yes or No 
• Does the LEMSA develop or participate in experiential training 
opportunities to enhance situational awareness skills? Yes or No 
• Do all training opportunities include realistic expectations of success? Yes 
or No 
• Do all training opportunities include the introduction of psychological 
impacts of a terrorist attack and how perceptions may be altered? Yes or 
No 
• Has the LEMSA pre-planned the response for mass-casualty disasters for 
the likeliest threats to the jurisdiction, and are lessons learned applied to 
plans on ongoing basis? Yes or No 
• Does the LEMSA know how to work within and use standardized incident 
command structure processes and manage mutual aid resources? Yes or 
No 
The same limitations identified above in the Measuring Performance Capability 
of the Ten Core EMS Disaster Response Roles section are applicable to these 
measurements as well. Evaluation requires subjective self-assessment.  
Appendix D contains suggested benchmarks that might be considered in 
evaluating a LEMSA’s progress towards participating in each activity. Benchmarks help 
to establish a baseline or starting point to measure achievement (Bryson, 2004, pp. 281–
283). The 31 benchmarks are offered as possible ways to measure the activities that lead 
to desirable disaster preparedness outcomes. This list is not exhaustive; there may be 
many other benchmarks to assist EMS agencies to enhance preparedness. Additionally, 
this list of benchmarks has not been tested to validate results definitively. Rather, these 
are offered as a starting point for jurisdictions. It is expected that use of these measures 
combined with future research will refine and improve the measurement process. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
One of the problems identified early in this research project is that EMS disaster 
preparedness has not been clearly defined. Some vital roles are provided in the Target 
Capabilities List and the National Response Guidelines; clearly, some work towards 
defining EMS disaster preparedness has been done. Yet, there is no nationally recognized 
consensus on the definition of EMS disaster preparedness. Moreover, very little EMS-
specific literature is available. Of the information available on the EMS discipline, most 
pertains to field operations. Even less information is obtainable on the administration of 
the EMS system or LEMSA in the support of the EMS system and support of core 
emergency medical operations. A gap in the literature exists for this niche sub-discipline. 
In addition to a lack of consensus on defining EMS disaster preparedness, 
consensus also does not exist on identifying the competencies needed to perform EMS’ 
disaster response roles. Further, no consensus has been reached on the data elements that 
may need to be collected to begin measuring disaster preparedness levels. Lastly, 
consensus does not exist in EMS on the selection of performance indicators. 
Perhaps, the research conducted herein contributes in a small way to begin filling 
the literature gap and providing information that may lead to broadly accepted consensus 
on LEMSA disaster preparedness. Traditional methods of reaching consensus involve 
deliberately trying to solve a problem through discussions, dialogue, debate, and mutual 
learning. Rather than trying to build consensus on a variety of theories and moving 
forward towards one vision, this research used the opposite approach. The researcher 
attempted to discover the actual commonalities between LEMSAs to identify where 
consensus may already exist. 
Conscious consensus may not exist. However, evidence has been uncovered 
through this research to indicate that LEMSAs are already doing many of the same things 
in regards to disaster response roles, skills, and equipment. A de facto consensus may 
already exist. 
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The Framework for LEMSA Disaster Preparedness found in Table 7-1 and 
Appendix B identifies areas of consensus among LEMSAs. The framework contains the 
10 most common disaster response roles performed by LEMSAs. Further, it lists the two 
essential competencies and knowledge bases LEMSAs identified as imperative to a 
successful response. Three specific skills needed to perform the disaster response roles, 
which are common to most LEMSAs, are discovered. Another area of consensus is the 
six tools and equipment most useful in LEMSA disaster response activities. Together, the 
Framework for LEMSA Disaster Preparedness defines LEMSA disaster preparedness. 
The elements of this framework paint the picture of what disaster preparedness looks like. 
Common roles, competencies, skills, and tools needed for a LEMSA to be minimally 
prepared for a disaster have been discovered and compiled.  
A great deal of time, energy, and money is spent in the name of disaster 
preparedness. Yet, no nationally accepted process is in place to evaluate EMS’ level of 
disaster preparedness. Without the ability to measure preparedness, LEMSAs and for that 
matter the country, do not have a keen understanding of response capabilities. In regards 
to funding, without measurements, no method exists to demonstrate that the investment in 
preparedness is worthwhile. 
Measuring disaster preparedness facilitates establishment of baselines in the level 
of preparedness. It is possible to determine if progress is being made in becoming better 
prepared by using benchmarks (Bryson, 2004, pp. 281–283). Additionally, measurements 
provide an element of accountability for the taxpayer and policy makers. 
Part of the difficulty in measuring disaster preparedness is knowing what to 
measure. The findings from this research identify 10 core LEMSA disaster response 
roles. Determining the jurisdiction’s capabilities at performing these roles will help to 
understand the extent to which one is prepared. As listed in Appendix C, several specific 
items for consideration are listed with each core LEMSA disaster response role to help 
assess the level of preparedness. LEMSAs that have the items or procedures in place, or 
some equivalent that better suits local needs, are more likely to be able to perform the 
core role than LEMSAs that do not. Having the ability to perform the 10 core roles 
increases the likelihood that a successful response can be executed. 
 101
Specific competencies, knowledge, and skills have been discovered that are 
essential for improving the chances for a successful LEMSA response. Again, knowing 
what to measure is difficult. Measuring intangibles can be problematic. Appendix D 
provides activities and strategies that support development of the competencies, 
knowledge, and skills. Implementing the strategies will create the environment that 
fosters development of the competencies, knowledge, and skills. Perfect implementation 
of the strategies does not guarantee an enhanced level of disaster preparedness. However, 
failure to foster development of the identified competencies, knowledge, and skills will 
decrease the chance for a successful response. 
Several benchmarks are offered with each strategy in Appendix D. Possible ways 
to measure progress in activities that may improve disaster preparedness exist. The 
measures are offered as a starting point for jurisdictions. Testing of each benchmark 
should be performed to validate its usefulness and accuracy. 
This thesis hypothesizes that it was possible and practical to define the skills and 
equipment that a LEMSA would need to perform strategic disaster response duties 
common to most if not all types of disasters. It was further hypothesized that it was 
possible to define performance indicators that could confirm that a LEMSA’s preparatory 
actions were sufficient to fulfill its disaster response role. Through the research process, it 
was in fact possible to do both. LEMSA disaster preparedness was defined; the 
competencies, knowledge, skills, and tools needed to respond to a disaster successfully 
discovered; and a series of performance indicators offered to measure a LEMSA’s level 
of disaster preparedness. 
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APPENDIX A. SURVEY AND INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Please circle or mark all functions that you or your organization performed during this 
disaster event. 
 
Assessment of Immediate Medical and Health Needs 
1. Activation of the Disaster Medical and Health System and notification of key 
positions; initiate recall to staff spare ambulances and provide immediate surge 
capability 
2. Transformation of pre-hospital system to disaster status 
3. Activate medical surge plans, procedures, and protocols 
4. Establish effective, reliable interoperable communications between EMS, incident 
command, public health, and healthcare facilities 




Coordination of Patient Distribution and Medical Evacuation 
6. Coordinate triage and pre-hospital treatment operations with on-site Incident 
Command 
7. Manage pre-hospital patient distribution and patient tracking 
8. Coordinate the establishment of temporary Field Treatment Sites (FTS); 
designate, manage and support FTS 
9. Manage facility-to-facility transfers (interfacility transfers) 
10. Coordinate the evacuation from damaged or overwhelmed medical facilities 
11. Activate alternative care sites and overflow emergency medical care facilities to 
manage hospital surge capacity 
12. Coordinate evacuation of casualties to outside the area if the local capacity is 
exceeded 
13. Coordinate receiving of casualties from other jurisdictions (providing mutual aid) 
Other___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Coordination of Disaster Medical and Health Resources 
14. Maintain an EMS resource inventory for the system 
15. Track use and assignments of personnel, equipment, and other non-disposable 
medical resources 
16. Provide medical support, safety considerations, and PPE for EMS responders and 
hospitals 
17. Assess need for additional medical resources (mutual aid) 
18. Ability to acquire, allocate, mobilize and support additional resources (mutual 
aid) 
19. Activate healthcare workers’ and volunteers’ call systems 
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20. Manage support to hospitals; ensure adequacy of medical equipment and supplies 
in support of immediate medical response operations and for restocking supplies/ 
equipment requested 
21. Coordinate acquisition of private source medical supplies 
22. Manage support to other health facilities; coordinate with alternative emergency 
medical providers (clinics, skilled nursing facilities) 
23. Monitor supply usage and stockpile levels of health facilities, mass prophylaxis 
sites, and other critical care venues; process and manage requests for additional 
medical supply personnel or equipment 
24. Request Strategic National Stockpile assets from Centers for Disease Control 
25. Ensure the timely provision of medical supplies to shelters and mass care and 
medical facilities 
26. Provide personnel for shelters and mass care and medical facilities 
27. Implement austere medical care standards, as appropriate, to manage mass 
casualty events   
Other___________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. Your contact information 









30. Think back to the time when you and your organization were responding to the 
disaster/incident and attempting to provide many if not all of the EMS roles listed 
above.  
a. Please describe the highpoints or moments you remember as having left 
you with an intense sense of pride, excitement, or involvement in having 
accomplished one or more of the roles listed above. As part of this 
description, please describe the outcomes that were achieved. 
b. Please further describe the experience;  
i. What was happening around you at the time?  
ii. Who was involved?  
iii. What made it so memorable? 
c. Further describe the experience; what specific skills, knowledge, talents, 
behaviors, fortune/luck, conversations, information, and other actions 
contributed towards your organization’s success and accomplishments 
related to this incident? 
d. Recall as best you can the steps or sequence of events you and your 
organization used to accomplish the role(s) listed on the previous page.  
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i. What tools, equipment, utensils, gear, or other tangible resources 
did you use? 
ii. What did you find most useful in achieving your 
accomplishments? 
iii. What were the outcomes? 
31. Imagine that you were faced with having to respond again to this kind of incident 
or some other disaster. Assume that the hypothetical future incident is now over 
and your organization performed exceeding well. Your organization has been 
praised by the community for its timely, competent response, and as a result of 
your organization’s actions lives were saved and suffering reduced. Accurate 
initial situation and resource assessments were made and effectively 
communicated; ongoing situation status reports were accurate, timely, and useful; 
ambulance crews, medical responders, hospitals, and other medical providers 
received all of the support, equipment, supplies, and personal care they needed to 
perform their jobs at peak performance; patients were treated, transported, 
transferred, and tracked flawlessly at all levels; and the field treatment sites were 
well-supported, efficient, and provided optimum interim care. 
a. What happened to achieve this level of success (both in preparation for 
and during the event)? 
b. What part did you and your EMS organization play in this success? 
c. What 3 wishes do you have to help your EMS organization reach and 
sustain this type of success? 
32. Please provide a copy of your organization’s after-action report prepared for the 
listed event, if one is available and can be shared. If it is available online, please 
provide the URL. 
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APPENDIX B. FRAMEWORK FOR LEMSA DISASTER 
PREPAREDNESS 
 
Ten Core EMS Disaster Response Roles 
1. Establishing effective, reliable interoperable communications between EMS, incident command, 
public health, and healthcare facilities 
2. Activating the disaster medical and health system and notification of key positions; initiating 
recall to staff spare ambulances, and provide immediate surge capability 
3. Assessing the need for additional medical resources (mutual aid) 
4.  The ability to acquire, allocate, mobilize, and support additional resources (mutual aid) 
5.  Being able to develop awareness of the situation and passing that information to others in the 
command chain  
6.  Activating medical surge plans, procedures, and protocols 
7. Managing pre-hospital patient distribution and tracking 
8. Tracking use and assignments of personnel, equipment, and other non-disposable medical 
resources  
9. Transforming the pre-hospital system to disaster status  
10. Maintaining an EMS resource inventory for the system  
 
Two Essential Competencies or Knowledge Bases  
• Experience –actual disaster response and/or drills and exercises  
• Preplanning –mass-casualty disaster response plans of likeliest threats; applying lessons learned 
to plans on ongoing basis 
 
Three Skills Needed to Perform Core Roles 
• Ability to build and maintain relationships across disciplines and across jurisdictions 
• Ability to work within and use standardized incident command structure processes and manage 
mutual aid resources 
• Ability to construct accurate situational awareness 
 
Six Tools or Equipment Most Useful in Performing Core Roles 
1. Cell phone 
2.  Two-way radio 
3.  Computer, along with various Internet applications 
4.  Telephone 
5.  Call Lists 
6. Geographic Information System mapping 
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APPENDIX C. CONSIDERATIONS FOR ASSESSING 
PERFORMANCE CAPABILITIES OF THE TEN CORE LEMSA 
DISASTER RESPONSE ROLES 
1. Can the LEMSA establish effective, reliable interoperable communications 
between EMS, incident command, public health, and healthcare facilities? 
Yes or No. 
Items to consider when assessing performance capabilities: 
• Multiple modes of communication equipment are available to each 
facility, including land line telephone; cell phone; two-way radio with 
common frequencies; hand-held two way radio; computer with Internet 
and e-mail capabilities; specialized common software for gathering and 
sharing resource and status information; back-up telephone infrastructure, 
e.g. microwave link with back-up T-1 connection; satellite phones; and 
access to HAM radio operators 
• Central dispatch operations for responding agencies that can facilitate 
channel assignments for each discipline or tactical group 
• Cable and airwave television 
• A comprehensive communications plan for the jurisdiction and region 
 
2. Can the LEMSA activate the disaster medical and health system and 
notification of key positions; initiating recall to staff spare ambulances, and 
provide immediate surge capability? Yes or No. 
Items to consider when assessing performance capabilities: 
• Accurate call lists of all key positions, personnel, and facilities 
• A plan with established criteria for knowing when to activate the disaster 
medical and health system 
• A system-wide surge protocol or policy 
• A plan, mechanism, or procedure to alert medical and healthcare facilities 
to initiate the surge protocol 
 
3. Can the LEMSA assess the need for additional medical resources (mutual 
aid)? Yes or No. 
Items to consider when assessing performance capabilities: 
• Ability to construct accurate situational awareness; number and extent of 
injuries from the event and real-time the bed capacity within the system 
• Understanding capabilities and needs of the local EMS system and 
hospital capacity 





4. Does the LEMSA have the ability to acquire, allocate, mobilize, and support 
additional resources (mutual aid)? Yes or No. 
Items to consider when assessing performance capabilities: 
• Understanding and working knowledge of the ICS/NIMS concepts 
• Pre-event identification of possible mutual aid resources 
• Procedures for activating and requesting mutual aid, including knowledge 
of resource typing standards 
• Availability of logistical support personnel 
 
5. Does the LEMSA possess the skills to develop awareness of the situation and 
pass that information to others in the command chain? Yes or No.  
Items to consider when assessing performance capabilities: 
• Possession of strong situational awareness skills 
• Understanding and working knowledge of the ICS/NIMS concepts 
• Availability of all tools and equipment listed in the Framework for 
LEMSA Preparedness 
 
6. Does the LEMSA have procedures and protocols in place for activating 
medical surge plans? Yes or No. 
Items to consider when assessing performance capabilities: 
• Existence of a surge plan and mass-casualty plan 
• Knowledge of plan concepts and the specific procedures 
• Ability to execute procedures 
 
7. Can the LEMSA manage pre-hospital patient distribution and tracking? Yes 
or No. 
Items to consider when assessing performance capabilities: 
• Determine how and by who this will be accomplished 
• Ensure infrastructure and equipment is in place to accomplish role 
• Redundant or alternate system is in place if primary technology fails 
during the event 
 
8. Can the LEMSA track use and assignments of personnel, equipment, and 
other non-disposable medical resources? Yes or No.  
Items to consider when assessing performance capabilities: 
• Determine how and by who this will be accomplished 
• Ensure infrastructure and equipment is in place to accomplish role 
• Redundant or alternate system is in place if primary technology fails 
during the event 





9. Can the LEMSA transform the pre-hospital system to disaster status? Yes or 
No.  
Items to consider when assessing performance capabilities: 
• Existence of a plan, standards, or criteria that can aid in decision making 
to transition the system 
• Existence of disaster operation standards or protocols for dispatch, pre-
hospital response, field treatment, austere care standards 
• Process to notify all EMS system providers of transition 
• Working knowledge of disaster operation standards or protocols by all 
EMS system personnel 
 
10. Does the LEMSA maintain an EMS resource inventory for the system? Yes 
or No.  
Items to consider when assessing performance capabilities: 
• Call lists 
• Number and types of ambulances 
• Other types of transportation equipment available, e.g. buses, wheelchair 
vans 
• Number of paramedics and EMTs 
• Number of licensed beds at each medical facility 
• Number of surge beds available at each facility 
• Number and location of disaster supply items available, e.g. surge tents, 
hand-held radios, mass-casualty triage kits, medical supplies and so on 
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APPENDIX D. MEASURING COMPETENCIES AND SKILLS 
Are all levels of LEMSA staff and volunteers exposed to experiential training 
sessions? Yes or No 
• Percentage of LEMSA staff fully participates in experiential disaster 
training opportunities, including table tops, and functional exercises 
• Percentage of LEMSA volunteers fully participate in experiential disaster 
training opportunities including table tops, and functional exercises 
 
Does the LEMSA leverage ICS/NIMS training opportunities to build relationships? 
Yes or No 
• LEMSA has identified the organizations that are likely to be first-
responders to a local disaster 
• LEMSA has identified the organizations that are likely to provide mutual 
aid during a local disaster 
• Percentage of ICS/NIMS training opportunities that include joint 
participation by the likely first-responder organizations and mutual aid 
providers 
 
Does the LEMSA provide trust-building opportunities at multi-disciplinary and 
multi-jurisdiction levels? Yes or No 
• Numbers of meetings annually in which LEMSA staff members interact 
with other response, medical-health, and other support disciplines 
• Numbers of meetings annually in which LEMSA staff members interact 
with other response, medical-health, and other support disciplines from 
probable mutual aid jurisdictions 
• Numbers of drills and exercises annually in which LEMSA staff members 
fully participate and engage other response, medical-health, and other 
support disciplines 
• Numbers of drills and exercises annually in which LEMSA staff members 
fully participate and engage other response, medical-health, and other 
support disciplines from probable mutual aid jurisdictions 
 
Does the LEMSA provide opportunities to build familiarization of individual 
responders through collaborative projects? Yes or No 
• Numbers of projects, committees, or task forces annually in which 
LEMSA staff members have the opportunity to interact with individuals of 
response, medical-health, and other support disciplines 
• Numbers of projects, committees, or task forces annually in which 
LEMSA staff members have the opportunity to interact with individuals of 
response, medical-health, and other support disciplines from probable 
mutual aid jurisdictions 
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• Numbers of activities annually, including informal social activities, in 
which LEMSA staff members have the opportunity to interact with 
individuals of response, medical-health, and other support disciplines 
• Numbers of activities annually, including informal social activities, in 
which LEMSA staff members have the opportunity to interact with 
individuals of response, medical-health, and other support disciplines from 
probable mutual aid jurisdictions 
 
Do all training opportunities include rare and unexpected elements to build 
schemata and enhance resilience? Yes or No 
• Percentage annually of training events, drills, and exercises that include 
rare or unexpected circumstance(s) 
• Number of other opportunities annually in which LEMSA staff members 
must cope with rare or unexpected circumstances 
• Number of formal events, meetings, drills, etc. in which LEMSA staff 
members have the opportunity to debrief and engage others at the 
conclusion or following the event 
 
Does the LEMSA develop or participate in experiential training opportunities to 
enhance situational awareness skills? Yes or No 
• Develop a list of atypical demands LEMSA staff members may possibly 
encounter during a response; continually update list as needed 
• Percentage of training sessions annually involving LEMSA staff members 
in which atypical demands were incorporated into the scenario and in 
which opportunities for group dialogue were conducted for addressing the 
atypical demand 
 
Do all training opportunities include realistic expectations of success? Yes or No 
• Identify actual outcomes from past disastrous or multi-casualty events; 
educate all LEMSA staff on past event outcomes 
• Percentage of training events in which LEMSA staff members had the 
ability to examine and analyze response constraints and identify the root 
cause of the constraint 
• Percentage of event debriefings annually in which LEMSA staff members 
participated/attended and then analyzed the data to determine strengths 
and weaknesses of the response 
 
Do all training opportunities include the introduction of psychological impacts of a 
terrorist attack and how perceptions may be altered? Yes or No 
• Number of times annually in which formal training addresses the concept 
that people will strive to alter the meanings of an attack or disastrous event 




• Percentage of formal multi-discipline debriefings held annually following 
significant multi-casualty events 
• Percentage of such debriefings in which a list of lessons learned were 
developed and in which response procedures were changed/improved 
based on the lessons 
 
Has the LEMSA pre-planned the response for mass-casualty disasters for the 
likeliest threats to the jurisdiction, and are lessons learned applied to plans on 
ongoing basis? Yes or No 
• Identify the realistic threats to the jurisdiction, which will involve an EMS 
response 
• Percentage of EMS response plans prepared for the realistic threats 
• Percentage of LEMSA staff members that have demonstrated knowledge 
of and ability to implement the plans 
 
Does the LEMSA know how to work within and use standardized incident 
command structure processes and manage mutual aid resources? Yes or No 
• Percentage of LEMSA staff members who have completed the ICS 100, 
200, 700, 800, 300, and 400 training and any other NIMS-related courses 
required by the jurisdiction 
• Percentage of LEMSA staff members that have demonstrated the ability to 
request and provide mutual aid resources through prescribed procedures 
• Number of times annually LEMSA staff members have used and applied 
the ICS structure in working with groups 
• Number of times annually LEMSA staff members have worked within the 
ICS structure in an actual response effort 
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